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ABSTRACT 
  Originalists routinely argue that originalism is the only coherent 
and legitimate theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article 
endeavors to undermine those claims by demonstrating that, despite 
the suggestion of originalist rhetoric, originalism is not a single, 
coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a 
disparate collection of distinct constitutional theories that share little 
more than a misleading reliance on a common label. Originalists 
generally agree only on certain very broad precepts that serve as the 
fundamental underlying principles of constitutional interpretation: 
specifically, that the “writtenness” of the Constitution necessitates a 
fixed constitutional meaning, and that courts that see themselves as 
empowered to give the Constitution some avowedly different meaning 
are behaving contrary to law. Originalists have been able to achieve 
agreement on these broad underlying principles, but they have often 
viewed as unduly narrow and mistaken the understanding held by the 
original originalists—the “framers” of originalism, if you will—as to 
how those principles must be put into action. And originalists disagree 
so profoundly amongst themselves about how to effectuate those 
underlying principles that over time they have articulated—and 
continue to articulate—a wide array of strikingly disparate, and 
mutually exclusive, constitutional theories. In this regard, originalists 
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have followed a living, evolving approach to constitutional 
interpretation. 
  Our account of originalism’s evolution—and of the extensive 
disagreement among originalists today—undermines originalists’ 
normative claims about the superiority of their approach. Originalists’ 
claims about the unique and exclusive legitimacy of their theory—that 
originalism self-evidently represents the “correct” method of 
constitutional interpretation—founder when one considers that 
originalists themselves cannot even begin to agree on what their 
“correct” approach actually entails. And their claims that originalism 
has a unique ability to produce determinate and fixed constitutional 
meaning, and thus that only originalism properly treats the 
Constitution as law and properly constrains judges from reading their 
own values into the Constitution, stumble when one considers the 
rapid evolution and dizzying array of versions of originalism; because 
each version has the potential to produce a different constitutional 
“meaning,” the constitutional meaning that a committed originalist 
judge would find turns out to be anything but fixed. As originalism 
evolves, the constitutional meanings that it produces evolve along with 
it. Today’s originalists not only reach results markedly different from 
those originalists reached thirty years ago, but also produce widely 
divergent results amongst themselves. Judges committed to the 
originalist enterprise thus have significant discretion to choose 
(consciously or subconsciously) the version of originalism that is 
most likely to dictate results consistent with their own preferences. As 
such, originalism suffers from the very flaws that its proponents have 
identified in its alternatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the last several decades, the primary divide in American 
constitutional theory has been between those theorists who label 
themselves as “originalists”1 and those who do not. It is widely 
understood that the side that does not embrace originalism is 
populated by proponents of a vast array of constitutional theories. To 
many proponents of originalism, the staggering diversity of these 
alternative approaches—which Justice Scalia and other originalists 
dismiss as nonoriginalism2 or, even more derisively (in their minds), 
“living” constitutionalism3—is evidence of their collective inferiority. 
Nonoriginalists, Justice Scalia explains, can reach “agreement on 
nothing except what is the wrong approach.”4 It takes a theory to beat 
a theory, he argues, but “it is hard to discern any emerging consensus 
among the nonoriginalists as to what this might be.”5 The “glaring 
defect of Living Constitutionalism,” he contends, “is that there is no 
agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the 
guiding principle of the evolution” of constitutional meaning.6 
This assertion trades implicitly on the notion that “originalism” 
represents a single, coherent constitutional theory, against which are 
arrayed the disparate nonoriginalist alternatives. Originalist rhetoric 
paints a powerful picture of originalism as a consistent, coherent 
 
 1. “Originalism” is a murky term, as this Article seeks to explain. But at its core, it treats 
“the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative 
for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004). 
 2. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); see 
also Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69 
(2003) (“[Non-originalists] have long borne the stigma of identification by negative 
appellation.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1126 n.42 (2003) (“Non-originalism 
seems best defined, derivatively, in contradistinction to originalism.”). 
 3. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 
694–97 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3, 38, 41–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). 
 4. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855. 
 5. Id.; accord Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
617 (1999) (“It takes a theory to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents of 
originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical alternative.”). 
 6. Scalia, supra note 3, at 44–45; accord Scalia, supra note 2, at 862–63 (“I also think that 
the central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the impossibility 
of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is 
abandoned.”). 
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theory that has stood the test of time7 while countless other 
convoluted theories—reverse-engineered by hopeless activists who 
start with desired results and try unsuccessfully to reason backward to 
a principled theory—have come and gone, all so plainly flawed that 
they are unable to attract adherents. To hear many originalists tell it, 
the fact that all of the smart and talented nonoriginalists have failed 
to come up with “the” alternative to originalism after decades of 
desperately trying—have failed, that is, to develop a theory that is 
coherent and compelling enough for the other nonoriginalists to rally 
around—suggests that no such theory is possible.8 Originalism, they 
insist, is the only coherent method of constitutional interpretation. As 
Raoul Berger puts it, because originalism has been a consistent 
theory of constitutional interpretation, whereas nonoriginalists 
“parade[] as many theories as writers” and there is little “consensus 
among activists about a theory of interpretation,”9 
“[o]riginalism . . . justifies itself by the falseness of the beliefs that 
oppose it.”10 
It is not just the rhetorical attraction of originalism, but also its 
normative force, that to a substantial degree turns on there being one, 
consistent originalist approach. To its proponents, originalism is not 
simply the only coherent approach, but also the only legitimate 
approach. Normative defenses of originalism are generally based on 
the notion that the predictability, determinacy, and coherence of the 
originalist approach both respects law and constrains judges. Those 
defenses typically begin by noting that originalism, unlike other 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, accords to the 
Constitution fixed and determinate meaning. This determinacy is 
essential, originalists maintain, to preserving the Constitution as a 
form of law in a democratic society; after all, “[w]hen we speak of 
‘law,’ we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change 
except through prescribed procedures,” such as those in Article V of 
 
 7. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 5, 11 (1988) (describing originalism as an “enduring standard”). 
 8. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 617 (“The inability of the most brilliant and creative 
legal minds to present a plausible method of interpretation that engendered enough confidence 
to warrant overriding the text . . . make[s] . . . originalism much more attractive.”). 
 9. Raoul Berger, New Theories of “Interpretation”: The Activist Flight from the 
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1986). 
 10. Id. at 44 (quoting Raymond Aron, Pensées, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1983, at E19); see also 
Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723, 754–55 (1991) (arguing that a 
“great merit of originalism” is “that it is a ‘simple’ concept” and noting that, by contrast, 
“[n]onoriginalists . . . cannot unite on a single alternative but struggle in a welter of theories”). 
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the Constitution.11 Originalists often assert that the propriety of 
originalism follows naturally from the very fact that the Constitution 
is a form of law; originalism, they say, is “almost self-evidently 
correct”12 and “so obvious that it should hardly need a name, let alone 
a defense.”13 Responding directly to the long-standing problem of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty—that is, the concern that judicial 
review allows unelected, unaccountable judges to thwart the will of 
democratically elected legislatures14—originalists further contend that 
the determinacy provided by reliance on constitutional text, or at 
least on some objective guidepost for the fixed meaning of the 
constitutional text, is essential to constraining judges’ ability to 
impose their own views under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation.15 
As a result, originalists insist, originalism is not merely a 
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, but rather is the 
only legitimate interpretive approach, and the only alternative to 
“judicial activism.” Prominent originalists have, for some time now, 
smugly declared that “there is a single, ‘true’ method of constitutional 
interpretation,”16 and that “[o]ther approaches to interpretation are 
simply wrong.”17 Any form of constitutional interpretation other than 
originalism “must end in constitutional nihilism and the imposition of 
the judge’s merely personal values on the rest of us.”18 
 
 11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 143 (1990); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL 
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 3 (1987). 
 12. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1019, 1020 (1992). 
 13. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., The Right Judicial Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, 
at A23. 
 14. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962) (describing the countermajoritarian 
difficulty). 
 15. See Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 928, 943 (1997) (reviewing 
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)) (noting originalism’s 
promise to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
 16. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129; see also id. at 1121 (arguing that the 
“interpretive project of determining the original public meaning of the Constitution” is “the 
only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document”). 
 17. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1834 
(1997) (emphasis added). 
 18. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 387 (1985). 
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Critics of originalism have sought to undermine these assertions 
by questioning the legitimacy of originalism,19 or by seeking to 
articulate alternative interpretive theories that can lay claim to 
coherence and legitimacy.20 But they have for the most part accepted 
uncritically the characterization of originalism as a coherent, 
monolithic theory that stands in marked contrast to the mishmash of 
divergent theories on the nonoriginalist side of the divide.21 
This Article argues that what both originalists and 
nonoriginalists alike have generally failed to appreciate is that this 
characterization is unfounded. In fact, just as with nonoriginalism, 
there is profound internal disagreement on the originalist side of the 
line.22 A review of originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not a 
single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but 
rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share 
little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label. The 
image of a monolithic theory standing tall and firm, deflecting 
 
 19. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 353, 354 (2007) (questioning whether “the Constitution and its original principles” 
are binding); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 
1105 (1998) (“Constitutionalism cannot survive when squeezed into a jurisprudence of a 
particular past moment, for it then lacks any account of its own legitimate authority, its own 
supremacy over the popular will of the present moment.”). See generally Daniel A. Farber, The 
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1095–96 (1989) 
(explaining that originalism is chiefly criticized for being “too static . . . to keep the Constitution 
up to date with changing times”). 
 20. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (1987) (presenting a “constructivist coherence 
theory” of constitutional interpretation). 
 21. Others have on occasion noted the basic point that, as Christopher Eisgruber once 
aptly put it, “[o]riginalism comes in a bewildering variety of colors and flavors.” CHRISTOPHER 
L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (2001); see also, e.g., Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009) (arguing that “literally 
thousands of discrete theses can plausibly claim to be originalist”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812 (1996) (“If ever a term muddied as much as it 
clarified, ‘originalism’ is it.”). But these observations have not been developed as the basis for 
an independent critique of originalism. Our endeavor here is to develop and illustrate this point 
in detail, and to derive from it a conclusion that others have missed: that the very existence of 
this discord substantially undermines the normative claims upon which originalism is typically 
based. 
 22. Indeed, the line that separates originalists from nonoriginalists itself is hazy at best. 
Few nonoriginalists ignore the original meaning, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and 
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 
(1997), and plenty of originalists are willing to accept interpretations of the Constitution that 
depart from the original meaning, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: 
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 155, 186 (2006). 
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countless hapless attempts to knock it down, is inaccurate. The more 
accurate picture is one of a collection of rapidly evolving theories, 
constantly reshaping themselves in profound ways in response to 
devastating critiques, and not infrequently splintering further into 
multiple, mutually exclusive iterations. 
Part I explains that, in a relatively short period of time, 
originalism has evolved dramatically—indeed, so dramatically that 
the brand of originalism advanced by some of its most prominent 
defenders today would be virtually unrecognizable to those in 
originalism’s vanguard in the 1970s and 1980s. More important, 
contrary to the suggestion of its proponents—for whom there is only 
originalism and everything else—there are today countless variations 
of originalism, and the differences among them are sometimes so 
stark that it is difficult to treat them as one coherent interpretive 
methodology. The original “jurisprudence of original intention”23 
slowly gave way to one of original meaning, determined by reference 
to the understanding—held by either the drafters, those who voted in 
state ratification conventions, or the general public, depending upon 
whom you asked—of the relevant provision at the time of its 
adoption. And from there, originalist theory gradually shifted again, 
to a jurisprudence of objective textual meaning. Today, pressing that 
theory to its logical extreme, several of the most prominent academic 
proponents of originalism dismiss not only the original intention of 
the Framers but also the actual original understanding of the Framing 
generation. Instead, they seek to determine how the words of the 
Constitution “would have been understood by a hypothetical, 
objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and 
phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the 
political and linguistic community in which they were adopted.”24 In 
the meantime, other prominent originalists who also claim to rely on 
original textual meaning have recast the theory in very different 
terms, as one that boldly empowers the judiciary to protect libertarian 
or even progressive visions of constitutional liberty. These various 
current forms of originalism have almost nothing in common with 
each other, or with the original originalism, except their self-
conscious adoption of the same label. Infighting among originalists 
 
 23. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the 
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 
11, at 96. 
 24. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132 (emphasis added). 
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has reached a fevered pitch, and it is not limited to disagreements 
about how the theory is properly applied to particular legal questions; 
rather, it concerns the very nature of the theory itself. 
In Part II, we analogize originalism’s evolution to living 
constitutionalism. Originalists, who have long criticized the notion of 
a living constitution, have themselves followed a living, evolving 
approach to constitutional interpretation. That is to say, originalists’ 
understanding of the relationship among originalism’s current 
meaning, its original meaning, and its underlying principles is similar 
to living constitutionalists’ understanding of the relationship among 
the Constitution’s current meaning, its original meaning, and its 
underlying principles. 
It is not our objective here to criticize originalists for continually 
refining their approach. Indeed, any rigorous theory must be capable 
of adaptation in the quest for perfection. But because the rhetorical 
and normative defenses of originalism—in whatever variation—turn 
so substantially on the claims that originalism is the only theoretically 
coherent and legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation, it is 
notable that it has become virtually impossible today to define what 
exactly originalism entails. With unintended irony, originalism has 
become something of a moving target, evolving from speech to 
speech, opinion to opinion, and law review article to law review 
article. Justice Scalia is perhaps correct when he argues that “it is not 
very helpful to tell a judge to be a ‘nonoriginalist.’”25 But the 
proliferation of competing models of originalism suggests that it is 
also increasingly unhelpful to tell a judge to be an originalist. The 
very notion of originalism itself has become indeterminate. 
Part III of this Article argues that this state of affairs has 
important implications for originalism’s normative defense. 
Originalists regularly advance at least three normative claims about 
the superiority of their approach. They contend: (1) that their 
methodology is the only theoretically coherent approach to 
constitutional interpretation; (2) that, because their approach accords 
to the Constitution a fixed and determinate meaning based on the 
document’s text, it is the only legitimate approach to constitutional 
interpretation—that is, the only approach that is consistent with the 
Constitution’s status as law and the judiciary’s role in a democratic 
society; and (3) (with perhaps less frequency today) that their 
 
 25. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855. 
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approach is uniquely promising for constraining the ability of judges 
to impose their own views under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation. We explain that the diversity in and evolution of 
originalist thought undermine these three claims. If even originalists 
cannot agree about what originalism is and what it entails, then how 
can originalism be uniquely coherent and self-evidently correct? And 
because different versions of originalism focus on different historical 
criteria—and, as a result, frequently produce different constitutional 
meanings—how can originalists maintain that originalism is uniquely 
determinate, and thus uniquely consistent with law and democracy? 
Finally, when one recognizes that the diversity of originalist theories 
allows originalist judges to pick and choose among the various strands 
of originalism from case to case to reach results that accord with their 
personal policy preferences, one is left to question the assertion that 
originalism is uniquely resistant to judicial activism. Indeed, as Part 
III explains, originalists can and often do move from one version of 
originalism to another as they decide different issues, thus allowing 
them to reach results that they personally prefer, all the while 
claiming (and likely mistakenly believing) that they are being guided 
by nothing more than the external constraint of history. For these 
reasons, the diversity of originalist theories undermines the very 
normative claims that tie those theories together. 
I.  ORIGINALISM’S EVOLUTION 
A. The Shifting Hub of Originalism 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, frustration among 
conservatives with the sweeping decisions of the Warren Court led 
critics to insist that the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to 
the intent of the Framers.26 In his confirmation hearings in 1971, for 
instance, soon-to-be-Justice Rehnquist promised that he would not 
“disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution and change it 
to achieve a result that [he] thought might be desirable for society.”27 
These were the origins of the modern originalist movement. 
 
 26. For example, Senator Sam Ervin asked Thurgood Marshall in the latter’s confirmation 
hearings, “Is not the role of the Supreme Court simply to ascertain and give effect to the intent 
of the framers of this Constitution and the people who ratified the Constitution?” Whittington, 
supra note 1, at 599–600. 
 27. Id. at 600 (quoting Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
McClellan, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)). 
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When scholars like Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, and political 
and judicial figures like Attorney General Edwin Meese III and then-
Justice Rehnquist, began to compose scholarly monographs 
articulating an intellectual defense of originalism in the 1970s and 
1980s, they repeated and developed the notion that the proper 
meaning of the Constitution is the meaning originally intended by the 
Framers. Meese insisted upon a “jurisprudence of original intention” 
that focused upon “the original intent of the Framers.”28 Rehnquist 
demanded allegiance to the “language and intent” of the “framers of 
the Constitution.”29 Bork insisted that “original intent is the only 
legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”30 And Berger 
decreed that any constitutional interpretive theory other than one 
grounded in “original intention” amounted to nothing more than a 
“judicial power to revise the Constitution.”31 
The theory of original intent was met with savage criticism, 
focusing most prominently on two fundamental weaknesses. First, it is 
nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent of a large 
group of individuals, each of whom may have had different 
intentions.32 Second, original intention is a self-defeating philosophy, 
insofar as much of the historical evidence suggests that the Framers in 
fact intended for future generations not to interpret the Constitution 
according to their intent—thus requiring the paradoxical conclusion 
that the only way to follow the intent of the Framers is not to follow 
the intent of the Framers.33 
Largely in response to these devastating critiques, originalists 
shifted the focus of their theory from the original intent of the 
 
 28. Meese, supra note 23, at 96–97. 
 29. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 694–97. 
 30. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986). 
 31. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 364 (1977); see also, e.g., Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an 
Old Problem—The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 
811, 811–12 (1983) (“[J]udges should be guided by the intent of the Framers of the relevant 
constitutional provisions.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 209–22 (1980). 
 33. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 907 (1985). Powell’s conclusion was that the “original intent” favored by the Framing 
generation was in fact an inquiry into “the ‘intentions’ of the sovereign parties to the 
constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution’s language and discerned through 
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the framers or 
of anyone else.” Id. at 948. 
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Framers to the original meaning of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia, 
who led the “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of 
Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning,”34 explained, 
originalists began to seek “the original meaning of the text, not what 
the original draftsmen intended.”35 Notwithstanding his central role in 
the original movement in favor of original intent, Judge Bork quickly 
joined that campaign.36 
The conventional wisdom holds that this was the watershed 
transition in originalist thought.37 Of course, this monumental shift 
alone substantially undermines the self-image of originalism as a 
single, coherent theory. Yet the inconsistency of originalism—the 
incoherence of the movement—runs much deeper. And it always 
has.38 
Even in the early days of “original intent” originalism, there was 
internal disagreement about the proper focus of the inquiry. The 
“intent of the Framers” was a misleading abstraction that implied a 
degree of agreement that was not really there. Just who were the 
“Framers” whose intentions mattered: the men who drafted the text 
of the Constitution and agreed upon it at the Philadelphia 
convention, or the men whose ratification votes at the subsequent 
 
 34. Antonin Scalia, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Address Before the 
Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, supra note 11, at 106. 
 35. Scalia, supra note 3, at 38. As one of us has previously written, 
This redirected focus on original meaning, rather than original intent, ostensibly 
avoids both the problem of determining the collective intent of the numerous 
Framers (the Framers may have had many reasons for enacting it, but the text 
nonetheless had only one meaning) and the problem of self-defeat (much of the 
historical evidence that was mustered to undermine the reliance on original intent 
actually supports the reliance on original meaning by suggesting that the Framers 
believed that the original meaning of the text, rather than the original intent of the 
drafters, would control future constitutional interpretation). 
Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 529, 531 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 36. See BORK, supra note 11, at 144 (“The search is not for a subjective intention. If 
someone found a letter from George Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by 
the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant, that would not change our reading of 
the Constitution in the slightest. Nor would the subjective intentions of all the members of a 
ratifying convention alter anything. When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what 
those words ordinarily mean.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 620–29; Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have 
an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking 
Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (2007). 
 38. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen tell a detailed and thoughtful tale of the 
evolution of originalist thought. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1134–48. But they too 
convey an unduly rosy impression of coherence and continuity. See id. 
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state conventions gave it the force of law? The early originalists could 
not agree on the answer to that question. Meese focused on the intent 
of the drafters;39 Berger initially concurred,40 but later shifted his focus 
to the intent of the ratifiers.41 
The move from original intent to original meaning exponentially 
multiplied that sort of internal disagreement among originalists. In 
some respects, that move was simply a semantic one. Even before the 
shift in rhetoric, Raoul Berger had defined “original intent” as “the 
meaning attached by the framers to the words they employed in the 
Constitution.”42 In other words, originalism was always to some 
degree, at least to some originalists, about original meaning.43 It was 
just that the original meaning was initially understood to be the 
meaning originally intended by the drafters—or perhaps the ratifiers, 
depending upon whom one asked. 
But the rhetorical shift from intent to meaning also had 
substantive implications—although exactly why it was important 
again depended upon who was telling the tale. For many originalists, 
the rhetorical change represented a shift from the intent of the 
Framers to the understanding of the Framers—from what the Framers 
actually intended the Constitution to mean to what they actually 
understood it to mean. Thus, as the focus shifted from original intent 
to original meaning, many originalists began to speak in terms of the 
 
 39. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1986) (“The standard of interpretation applied by the 
judiciary must focus on the text and the drafter’s original intent.”); see also, e.g., Earl Maltz, 
Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 774 (calling for “a jurisprudence 
based on the intent of the drafters”). 
 40. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 365 (“Effectuation of the draftsman’s intention is a long-
standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all documents . . . .”); RAOUL BERGER, 
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 3–20 (1987). 
 41. See Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove’s Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 640–
41 (1997) (arguing that although the drafters’ intentions and understandings are usually 
dispositive, they are so only when in accord with those of the ratifiers). Bork seems initially not 
to have taken a stand. See Bork, supra note 30, at 826 (pressing the necessity of “interpret[ing] 
the document’s words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified 
its provisions and its various amendments”). Later, he explained that the focus should be on the 
“ratifying conventions” because it is “their intent, not the drafters’, that counts.” BORK, supra 
note 11, at 181. 
 42. BERGER, supra note 31, at 363. 
 43. Indeed, Justice Black explicitly demanded a jurisprudence of original meaning in 1966. 
See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (lambasting 
the Court for “consulting its own notions rather than following the original meaning of the 
Constitution”). 
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“public understanding” of the meaning of the Constitution.44 These 
originalists explained that a judge should determine “what the 
original language actually meant to those who used the terms in 
question”45—that is, the “meaning of the provision to the public on 
whose behalf it was ratified.”46 As Keith Whittington explains, this 
change in focus stemmed from the belief that, “[i]n ratifying the 
document, the people appropriated it, giving its text the meaning that 
was publicly understood.”47 
This shift was significant, but it was not a clean break. One can 
find many references to original understanding in the early writings of 
the originalists whose work is generally associated with original 
intent, rather than original meaning.48 And one can find many 
references to original intent in the later writings of the originalists 
whose work is generally associated with original meaning, rather than 
original intent.49 What is more, the move to original understanding did 
not obviate the disagreement over whose intentions matter; it simply 
replaced that debate with a new one among originalists—at least, that 
is, among those originalists who abandoned the quest for original 
intent—as to whose understanding matters. Some originalists have 
focused on the understanding of the drafters;50 others on the 
 
 44. E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 331, 339 (2004). 
 45. Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A 
Reply to Professor Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2005). 
 46. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1991); see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme 
Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) 
(“What counts as text is the document as understood by the American People who ratified and 
amended it . . . .”). 
 47. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1999). 
 48. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 366–67 (quoting favorably Jefferson’s promise as 
the president to administer the Constitution “according to the safe and honest meaning 
contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption”). 
 49. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme 
Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1097, 1112 (2004) (“Surely, if that had been the framers’ intent, there would have been extended 
discussion and controversy about the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV during the 
ratification debates, which there was not.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Theory—A Comment 
on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 696 (1991) (arguing that originalism 
“focuses on the original understanding of those who drafted the fourteenth amendment”). 
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understanding of the ratifiers;51 and still others on the understanding 
of the public.52 
For another group of originalists, the move to original meaning 
was more profound than a simple shift from subjective intentions to 
subjective understandings. It was instead a shift from subjective 
meaning—what particular individuals actually intended the text to 
mean—to objective meaning—the meaning reasonably suggested by 
the words of the Constitution, as used in context at the time that they 
were adopted. Slowly, the “original understanding” incarnation of the 
“original meaning” incarnation of originalism has given way, for these 
originalists anyway, to an originalism that focuses on objective 
meaning.53 
At first, this notion of “objective” meaning was seemingly tied to 
the actual understanding of the people. In insisting on objective 
constitutional meaning, for example, the Reagan Justice Department 
explained that “[o]ur fundamental law is the text of the Constitution 
as understood by the ratifying society, not the subjective views of any 
group or individual.”54 In other words, the objective meaning is the 
one actually shared by the ratifying society as a whole: “The common 
understanding of the text is what counts . . . .”55 As Justice Scalia 
explained it, the originalist should seek the “meaning of the words of 
the Constitution to the society that adopted it—regardless of what the 
Framers might secretly have intended.”56 
Indeed, some originalists who seek the original, objective 
meaning have in fact gone so far in the direction of reliance on the 
actual public understanding as dispositive proof of original meaning 
that they determine original meaning by reference to the concrete 
 
 51. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 35–37; Charles A. Lofgren, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (discussing “ratifier 
intent”); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the 
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) (noting Alexander Hamilton’s statements focusing 
on the ratifiers’ intentions). 
 52. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the idea that the words of the Constitution 
must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at the time of enactment.”); 
Perry, supra note 46, at 677 (“It is the meaning to, or the understanding of, those, the 
enfranchised, in whom sovereignty ultimately resides and on whose behalf the ratifiers acted—
those the ratifiers ‘represented’—that should matter.”). 
 53. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 14–15; Scalia, supra note 3, at 38. 
 54. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 17. 
 55. Id. at 20. 
 56. Scalia, supra note 34, at 103. 
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expectations of the Framing generation as to how the constitutional 
provision at issue would apply to a particular practice57—an approach 
that some commentators call original-expected-application 
originalism.58 Justice Scalia often employs a particular version of this 
practice in resolving constitutional questions,59 even though he has 
disavowed it in his scholarly writing.60 Justice Scalia has frequently 
decided cases on the basis of the proposition that if the first 
Congresses and presidents engaged in a practice, then the Framing 
generation must have expected and thus understood the practice to 
be constitutional—in which case it “necessarily remains constitutional 
today.”61 So wedded is Justice Scalia in these cases to the Framers’ 
expectations—as evidenced by the actions of early officials—that he 
does not bother even to attempt to articulate the original meaning. As 
Andrew Koppelman explains, “Scalia’s claim is that whatever 
the . . . Clause means, it cannot apply to a practice of which the 
Framers knew and approved. The argument is essentially, ‘I have no 
idea what this provision means. But whatever it means, it can’t 
prohibit this, because the framers approved of it.’”62 Koppelman 
refers to this brand of originalism as “I Have No Idea Originalism.”63 
 
 57. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–79 (2007) (arguing in favor of giving very 
heavy weight to original expected application). 
 58. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–97 
(2007). This theory is premised not only on the notion that the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is determined by “the meanings that words had at the time they were adopted” as 
“read in light of [the provision’s] underlying principles,” but also on the notion that “the 
concepts and principles underlying those words must be applied in the same way they would 
have been applied when they were adopted.” Id. at 296 (emphasis omitted). 
 59. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 295–96 (“Scalia’s version of ‘original meaning’ is not 
original meaning in my sense, but actually a more limited interpretive principle, what I call 
original expected application.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a 
Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 386 (2007) (“[M]uch of Scalia’s 
writing . . . does appear to endorse and rely upon the expectation originalism that he purports to 
reject.”); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 555, 556–58 (2006) (noting Justice Scalia’s suggestion that “in order to maintain a stable 
constitutional meaning, we must adhere to the Founders’ practices” (emphasis omitted)); Mark 
D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 574–82 
(1998) (surveying Justice Scalia’s opinions involving fidelity to originally expected practices). 
 60. See infra notes 259–66 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Colby, supra note 35, at 574. 
 62. Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727, 737 (2009). 
 63. Id. 
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Most originalists who seek the original, objective meaning of the 
Constitution, however, have explicitly rejected this practice.64 Indeed, 
originalists have found themselves disagreeing with Justice Scalia on 
matters of constitutional theory with increasing frequency. As 
originalists Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen explain, 
“even though Justice Scalia remains the dominant figure in the shift 
to originalist textualism, his is not always the most refined or 
consistent version of the theory. In some ways, he is a leader whose 
followers have bettered the leader’s own work.”65 According to 
Kesavan and Paulsen, “[s]cholars and judges a half-generation 
younger than Scalia, who are in some respects his heirs, often appear 
to be employing more thoroughly and carefully honed versions of 
originalist textualism.”66 As two such prominent originalists recently 
said in taking issue with Justice Scalia, “[o]ne can disagree with giants 
even when standing on their shoulders.”67 
This newer generation of originalists has developed a theory that 
some of its proponents have labeled “original, objective-public-
meaning textualism.”68 This theory disavows not only original intent, 
but also original understanding.69 Its proponents do not concern 
themselves with how the words of the Constitution were actually 
understood by the Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or anyone else, 
 
 64. See Berman, supra note 59, at 385–89 (“[L]eading academic defenders of originalism 
have been disavowing expectation originalism for years.”); Colby, supra note 35, at 579–80 (“[I]t 
would be a mistake to assume, as many commentators seem to do, that original expected 
application is the prevailing academic model of originalism.”); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” 
of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997) (“[N]o reputable originalist, with 
the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that the Framers’ ‘assumptions and 
expectation about the correct application’ of their principles is controlling.”). In particular, they 
have disagreed with the assertion that the mere fact that the First Congress engaged in a 
practice necessarily means that the practice is constitutional. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & 
Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A 
Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1045 (2007) (“The touchstone 
must always be the Constitution, not what anyone in particular, including the First Congress, 
says about the Constitution.”). 
 65. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1140. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 64, at 1009; see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s 
Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 23 (2006) (arguing 
that “Justice Scalia misunderstands what originalism requires”). 
 68. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132 (emphasis omitted). 
 69. See id. (“It is not a theory of anyone’s intent or intention. Nor is it a theory of anyone-
in-particular’s understanding. Nor is it a theory of the collective intention of a particular body of 
people, or of a society as a whole.”). 
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but rather with how a hypothetical, reasonable person should have 
understood them. They “do not regard the search for original 
meaning as a search for historically concrete understandings. Instead, 
[they] conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms.”70 
This jurisprudence is so far removed from the “original” 
originalism of the likes of Raoul Berger and Edwin Meese as to be an 
entirely different constitutional theory. Kesavan and Paulsen explain 
that “when [they] use the term ‘originalism,’ it is not in reference to a 
theory of ‘original intent’ or ‘original understanding.’”71 But when 
Berger and Meese use the term “originalism,” it is in reference to a 
theory of “original intent.”72 And when Bork and a great many other 
originalists use the term “originalism,” it is—at least more recently, 
even if not always—in reference to a theory of “original 
understanding.”73 Gary Lawson explains that original, objective-
public-meaning textualism 
is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public 
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution 
and the surrounding world, would understand a particular provision. 
Actual historical understandings are, of course, relevant to that 
inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the inquiry—nor are 
they even necessarily the best available evidence.74 
But Raoul Berger, by contrast, had adamantly insisted as 
recently as 1997 that “[o]riginalists do not speculate about how the 
Founders ‘would have’ construed their handiwork; we rely rather on 
what they actually understood, on their accompanying explanations 
of what their words mean and are intended to accomplish.”75 
 
 70. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 25 (2001). 
 71. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1132. 
 72. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9, at 2 (“‘[O]riginalists’ . . . maintain that the provisions of 
the Constitution mean what the Founders intended them to mean—the ‘original intention.’”); 
Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151, 1159 n.48 (1993) 
(“Originalists seek the maker’s intention.” (emphasis omitted)); Edwin Meese III, Reagan’s 
Legal Revolutionary, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 193, 193 (2000) (noting that originalism involves “a 
deep-seated commitment to the doctrine of original intent”). 
 73. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 11, at 143–44. 
 74. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
 75. Berger, supra note 41, at 627 (emphasis omitted). 
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B. The Many Spokes of Originalism 
What is more, even among those originalists who claim to rely on 
the original, objective public meaning of the constitutional text, there 
is profound disagreement about the nature and effect of originalism. 
Randy Barnett, for instance, appears to have espoused loyalty to the 
new school of “original meaning” that focuses on the objective 
meaning of the text.76 Aligning himself with Lawson, Paulsen, and 
others, Barnett “claims to use the exact methodology those 
sophisticated originalists use.”77 Yet he believes—in sharp contrast to 
the other originalists whose methodology he generally shares—that 
the major rights-granting provisions of the Constitution, including the 
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, objectively have such a broad meaning that 
they direct judges to interpret them at a very high level of 
generality78—so high in fact that they should be read to embody a 
“presumption of liberty”79 and essentially to “mandate[] 
libertarianism at both the state and federal level.”80 Barnett’s 
originalism, which empowers the judiciary aggressively to protect 
countless individual rights from democratic infringement, is the 
antithesis of the originalism of Scalia, Bork, and the many others who 
seek to preserve democratic rule by limiting the scope of judicial 
power to interfere with the output of democratically elected 
decisionmakers and by narrowing the pool and scope of enforceable 
individual constitutional rights.81 For this reason, other originalists 
have been highly critical of Barnett’s theory.82 And Barnett, in turn, 
 
 76. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 620–29. Some of Barnett’s work seems to straddle—or not 
to acknowledge—the line between the actual original public understanding and the hypothetical 
understanding of an objective observer. Compare id. at 621 (seeking “the objective original 
meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision 
at the time of its enactment”), with id. at 627–28 (arguing that “[t]he public meaning of the 
words of the Constitution, as understood by the ratifying conventions and the general 
public . . . should prevail”). 
 77. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081. 
 78. See Barnett, supra note 67, at 23 (“That the founders . . . drafted texts that leave some 
discretion in application to changing circumstances is not a bug. It’s a feature. Applying the 
more abstract provisions of a text is required by a proper approach to originalism.”). 
 79. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 253–69 (2004). 
 80. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081. 
 81. See infra Part III.C. 
 82. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1083–97 (“Barnett . . . claims that originalism leads 
to judicial activism . . . . [but] Barnett . . . has failed in his quest to accurately describe the true 
original understanding of the Constitution.”); Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody 
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has been highly critical of other originalists—specifically those 
“original public meaning originalists [who] would have courts ignore 
the original meaning of the text when it is insufficiently rule-like.”83 
Similarly, Michael Perry endorses a jurisprudence that seeks the 
“‘objective meaning’ to the public at the time the provision was 
ratified.”84 Perry explains that this inquiry is hypothetical: “it is what 
the public ‘would have’ understood that should matter.”85 But his 
originalism has a unique flavor. It “does not entail . . . a small or 
passive judicial role.”86 Rather, because the Constitution is so 
textually vague and open-ended, Perry believes that judges can 
legitimately choose between many plausible original meanings, at 
varying levels of generality, such that much of the Supreme Court’s 
modern individual rights jurisprudence can (and should) be defended 
on originalist grounds.87 
And the originalist tent keeps getting bigger. Bernadette Meyler, 
for instance, has recently articulated a theory of “common law 
originalism” that seeks the meaning of legal terms of art in the 
Constitution by reference to the common law, but, “rather than 
[being] static or inflexible,” “regards the strands of eighteenth-
century common law not as providing determinate answers that fix 
the meaning of particular constitutional clauses but instead as 
supplying the terms of a debate about certain concepts, framing 
questions for judges but refusing to settle them definitively.”88 
 
a “Presumption of Liberty”?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 321–37 (criticizing the arguments that 
Barnett advances in Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty). 
 83. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (2005). Barnett cites Justice Scalia as an example of 
such an originalist. See id. at 264 n.21. Michael Stokes Paulsen would be another example. See 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289, 296 n.18 (2005) (“[A] decision invalidating political action where the 
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous (in the sense of failing to yield a determinate rule of 
law) is simply an incorrect constitutional decision. Adherence to such a precedent is adherence 
to a decision that is incorrect on originalist grounds and thus corrupts the interpretive theory of 
originalism.”). 
 84. Perry, supra note 46, at 677 (emphasis omitted). 
 85. Id. 
 86. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 55 
(1994). 
 87. See Richard B. Saphire, Originalism and the Importance of Constitutional Aspirations, 
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 612–21 (1997) (“Perry now argues that originalism and a defense 
of the modern constitutional jurisprudence of human rights can coexist. . . . [A]n originalist can 
feel free to adopt either [plausible] position.”). 
 88. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558 
(2006). 
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Similarly, Jack Balkin has announced his recent conversion to 
originalism.89 But his version of originalism, which he labels “text and 
principle,” contemplates a Constitution “whose reach and application 
evolve over time.”90 Balkin explains that under his theory, Roe v. 
Wade91 was correctly decided.92 To most originalists, however, Roe 
represents the very epitome of illegitimate constitutional 
decisionmaking.93 It is thus likely, as Ethan Leib speculates, that 
“many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist in 
disguise—and may not let him into their club.”94 
Perhaps. But there is, alas, no official gatekeeper for that club. 
There is no person or body with the accepted authority to decide 
whose theory is a pure version of originalism, and whose is not. As a 
result, there is no single, formal, canonical version of originalism. 
Indeed, any self-appointed gatekeeper who sought to weed out the 
Balkins and the other heretics would probably find herself rejecting 
the majority of originalists, because no matter which version of 
originalism the gatekeeper followed, her theory would likely be 
fundamentally inconsistent with that of many, or even most, other 
originalists. As it turns out, there is no theory of originalism that 
commands anywhere near universal consensus, even among self-
professed originalists. 
That discordance is not simply the product of the passage of 
time. The history of originalism has not been a tidy story of steady, 
linear evolution. Instead, at any given point in time, there have been 
many mutually inconsistent theories of constitutional interpretation 
that are unified, for the most part, only by their claims to carry the 
banner of originalism. 
 
 89. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 293 (“I maintain . . . that constitutional interpretation 
requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie 
the text.”). 
 90. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 92. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 319–36. 
 93. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 63. 
 94. Leib, supra note 19, at 355; see also, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, 
and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1371–72 (2009) (criticizing Balkin’s 
theory and pressing the need “to distinguish genuinely originalist interpretations from those that 
amount to living constitutionalism . . . dressed up in originalist clothing”). But see Randy E. 
Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 416 (2007) (taking Balkin at his word 
that “he is sincere in his embrace of original meaning originalism” and expressing a substantial 
amount of agreement with parts of his theory, while rejecting other parts of it). 
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Consider, for instance, the state of originalism during one 
snapshot in history in the late 1980s. In 1985, Michael Perry observed 
that there were “different ways to conceive of originalism (and thus 
of ‘an originalist approach to adjudication’).”95 Two years later, a 
Federalist Society symposium on constitutional interpretation took 
that conclusion to heart when it held a panel discussion on the topic 
of “Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation.” At that 
symposium, Robert Bennett explained that there are different 
“kind[s] of originalism,”96 a point elaborated upon in some detail by 
Michael Moore, who explained that there are both “intentionalist” 
and “textualist” flavors of originalism—each markedly different from 
the other—and that, in turn, each of those subtheories has itself been 
subdivided by originalists into still many more and different operating 
versions.97 Thus, explained Moore: “Raoul Berger’s ‘old-time 
religion’—intentionalist interpretation—is badly fractionated. There 
is not just one kind of intentionalism.”98 Moore explained that the 
same was true of the “textualist”—or “original meaning”—flavor of 
originalism: “Textualism too is badly fractionated as a theory of 
interpretation.”99 In response, Raoul Berger proclaimed himself 
“surprised to hear about varieties of originalism,” declaring, “[t]he 
only variety I know is the good, old-fashioned kind”—the kind that 
treats “original intention” as dispositive.100 But Michael McConnell, 
also a proud originalist, responded by defending a particular version 
of “original-meaning” originalism101 that is quite distinct from 
Berger’s original-intent originalism. Indeed, McConnell vigorously 
rejected original intent as illegitimate, even going so far as to give an 
example of a case that “represents original intent subverting the 
principle of the rule of law.”102 
 
 95. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 597 (1985). 
 96. Robert Bennett, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 355, 355 (1988). 
 97. Michael Moore, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 364, 364–66 (1988). 
 98. Id. at 365. 
 99. Id. at 366. 
 100. Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 350, 350 (1988). 
 101. In so doing, however, McConnell rejected the “original expected application” 
jurisprudence often employed by Justice Scalia. See Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the 
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361–63 (1987). 
 102. Id. at 362 (discussing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
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That disagreement in the late 1980s did not reflect a onetime 
bout of growing pains in the originalist movement. Indeed, if 
anything, this state of affairs—the existence of an endless variety of 
constitutional theories all claiming the mantle of originalism—has 
become even more pronounced. There are not many proponents of 
original-intent originalism left today,103 but original-understanding 
originalism remains highly popular, in all of its various incarnations, 
as does original, objective-meaning originalism—in all its countless 
iterations, from the liberal versions of Jack Balkin and Michael Perry, 
to the libertarian versions of Randy Barnett and Timothy Sandefur,104 
to the conservative versions of Justice Scalia and his many allies, to 
the extremely textualist versions of Gary Lawson and Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, to the philosophical version of Lawrence Solum.105 
And the debates among originalists today do not end there. To 
take just one example of the polarizing debates currently raging in the 
originalist community, consider the role of precedent in originalist 
theory. Justice Scalia has famously declared himself to be a “faint-
hearted originalist,” insofar as he would sometimes allow judicial 
precedent or societal custom to trump the original meaning of the 
Constitution.106 Justice Scalia insists that “almost every originalist 
would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis.”107 
But a growing number of originalists would not. Gary Lawson, for 
instance, has argued that it is unconstitutional for the Supreme Court 
 
 103. But there are still a few. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism 1 
(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-067, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235722 (“[G]iven what we 
accept as legally authoritative, the proper way to interpret the Constitution . . . is to seek its 
authors’ intended meanings . . . .”). See generally Berman, supra note 59, at 384 (“[T]here does 
exist a live intramural disagreement among originalists concerning whether to abide by the 
originally intended meaning of the framers (or ratifiers) of constitutional text or the text’s 
original public meaning.”). 
 104. See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 489, 490–91 (2004) (articulating, based in substantial part on the work of Scott 
Gerber, a version of originalism that relies on the Declaration of Independence as part of the 
nation’s organic law). 
 105. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2, 28–30 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 
(articulating a version of original-public-meaning originalism that seeks a theoretical foundation 
in the philosophy of language). 
 106. Scalia, supra note 2, at 864; see also Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 138–40 (“Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation 
put into practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it 
cannot remake the world anew.”). 
 107. Scalia, supra note 2, at 861. 
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to follow a precedent that deviates from the Constitution’s original, 
objective meaning.108 And Michael Stokes Paulsen concurs that “stare 
decisis . . . is completely irreconcilable with originalism.”109 Indeed, 
Randy Barnett has argued that, because Justice Scalia sometimes is 
willing to allow stare decisis to trump original meaning, “Justice 
Scalia is simply not an originalist.”110 Even Justice Scalia admits that 
“stare decisis is not part of [his] originalist philosophy; it is a 
pragmatic exception to it.”111 
But some prominent originalists—including Robert Bork,112 
Lawrence Solum,113 and Steven Calabresi,114 among others115—have 
 
 108. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23, 27–28 (1994) (“If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, a court 
has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the Constitution.”). But cf. Gary Lawson, 
Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 18–22 
(2007) (arguing that stare decisis might be consistent with originalism when the prior decision 
used the proper methodological approach to discern original meaning, even if it reached an 
erroneous conclusion about the original meaning). Justice Thomas also appears to disagree, at 
least to some extent, with Justice Scalia on the desirability and permissibility of deviating from 
original meaning in the name of stare decisis. See Stephen B. Presser, Was Ann Coulter Right? 
Some Realism About “Minimalism,” 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 23, 28 (2007) (stating that Justice 
Thomas “has argued that . . . constitutional adjudication should not involve the assumption that 
stare decisis is the binding rule”). 
 109. Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289. According to Paulsen, “[s]tare decisis contradicts the 
premise of originalism—that it is the original meaning of the words of the text, and not anything 
else, that controls constitutional interpretation.” Id. 
 110. Barnett, supra note 67, at 13. According to Barnett, a true “originalist simply could not 
accept that the Supreme Court could change the meaning of the text from what it meant as 
enacted and still remain an originalist.” Barnett, supra note 83, at 263. Michael Stokes Paulsen 
agrees, calling those who, like Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, would sometimes adulterate 
originalism with precedent “would-be originalists.” Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289 n.2. 
 111. Scalia, supra note 106, at 140. 
 112. See BORK, supra note 11, at 155–59 (arguing that “[a]t the time of ratification, judicial 
power was known to be to some degree confined by an obligation to respect precedent”). 
 113. See Solum, supra note 22, at 195–96 (arguing for “a system in which the decisions of the 
Supreme Court which respect that text and original meaning are given binding effect”). 
 114. See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and 
Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 314, 335–48 (2005) (“My conclusion is therefore that practice 
has settled the matter such that the Court does have an autonomous, implied power to 
sometimes follow precedent . . . .”). 
 115. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1441 (2007) (“Preserving legitimacy under popular sovereignty-based 
originalism . . . does not require the complete abandonment of stare decisis.”); Lee J. Strang, An 
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 
36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 419–21 (2006) (arguing that “limited respect is due some nonoriginalist 
constitutional precedent because of the larger societal and constitutional goal of effectively 
pursuing the common good”). 
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argued that some limited use of stare decisis to override the original 
meaning is consistent with originalism. And other scholars have gone 
even further in favor of reconciling stare decisis with originalism—so 
far as to suggest that originalism requires the use of stare decisis in 
some circumstances. Polly Price, for example, argues that the original 
meaning of the “‘judicial power’ in Article III encompassed 
significant respect for prior precedent as a starting point for judicial 
decision making,” such that, “as a matter of original understanding,” 
“an originalist owes some obligation to a nonoriginalist precedent.”116 
There is profound disagreement among originalists about this 
fundamental aspect of their theory. And, as should be plain from the 
account provided here, disagreement among originalists about 
matters of considerable importance is becoming the rule, not the 
exception. 
II.  ORIGINALISM’S LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
One conclusion that could be drawn from this conceptual 
diversity and disagreement is that “originalism” is not a constitutional 
theory at all, but rather is simply rhetorical code for a commitment to 
a series of particular judicial outcomes favored by political 
conservatives. A colorable case can be made for this claim,117 
especially if one recognizes that judges might be guided by such a 
commitment at the purely subconscious level.118 But making sense of 
the evolution and dissonance of originalist theory does not necessitate 
that degree of cynicism. Originalism might better be understood by 
 
 116. Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare Decisis, 
and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 114 (2007); see also Lund, supra note 94, at 
1347 (noting that “there is strong evidence that the Vesting Clause of Article III implicitly 
incorporated a principle of stare decisis”); cf. Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the 
Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 664 (2006) (arguing that originalists must account 
for the apparent original understanding that the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions 
would be “fixed” by adjudication). 
 117. See Bennett, supra note 96, at 358 (“What really animates much of the originalist 
enterprise is not a reasoned conclusion that there is a theory there, but rather a dissatisfaction 
with what is perceived to be mischievous judicial activism.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487, 492 (1996) 
(noting that “defenses of originalism, with rare exceptions, leave its nature mushy and 
confused” and concluding that originalism is in reality “most often a political or rhetorical 
stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively narrow set of 
constitutional issues in the current age”). 
 118. See infra notes 225–310 and accompanying text. 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
2009] LIVING ORIGINALISM 263 
reference to its archnemesis, living constitutionalism.119 Modern 
originalism’s genesis, of course, was as a response to the perceived 
excesses of the theory of the living constitution.120 But originalism is a 
jurisprudential theory undergoing its own endless evolution, with its 
own living constitution. That is to say, originalists’ understanding of 
the relationship among originalism’s current meaning, its original 
meaning, and its underlying principles is similar to living 
constitutionalists’ understanding of the relationship among the 
Constitution’s current meaning, its original meaning, and its 
underlying principles. Just as the theory of living constitutionalism 
permits the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions to evolve to 
reflect current societal values, the theory of originalism permits the 
meaning of originalism to evolve to reflect current interpretive values. 
Consider the argument that Justice Brennan, a leading 
proponent of the theory of the living constitution, advanced about the 
evolution of constitutional meaning. He argued that although the 
“struggles against particular malefactions of the Crown . . . shape[d] 
the particular contours” of the “fundamental principles” that the 
Framers discerned, “our acceptance of the fundamental principles has 
not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic, 
contours.”121 According to this view, the Constitution contains broad, 
 
 119. The term “living constitution” is generally attributed to Thomas Grey, see Thomas C. 
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1975), although it 
almost certainly has a lengthier pedigree than that, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The 
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1998) (discussing the constitutional 
theories of Sidney George Fisher and Christopher Tiedeman, who “urged the Court to 
‘recognize the present will of the people as the living source of law’ and, ‘in construing the law, 
to follow, and give effect to, the present intentions and meaning of the people’” (quoting 
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 
(Putnam 1978) (1890))). The notion of living constitutionalism is itself a broad tent. The version 
that we have in mind here is the one articulated by Justice Brennan, the originalists’ own 
boogeyman. Brennan argued: 
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth-
century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the 
intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do the 
words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in 
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. 
What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be 
the measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for 
us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986). 
 120. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 121. Brennan, supra note 119, at 437; see also Barnett, supra note 67, at 19 (“Although 
alternatives to originalism are surprisingly hard to identify with any specificity, there is one very 
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general principles that can—and ought to—be adapted to current 
circumstances and understandings. 
The same can be said of originalism. As our discussion suggests, 
and as we explain in further detail in Part III, originalists generally 
are in agreement only on certain very broad precepts that serve as the 
fundamental underlying principles of constitutional interpretation: 
specifically, that the “writtenness” of the Constitution necessitates a 
fixed constitutional meaning, and that courts that see themselves as 
generally empowered to give the Constitution some avowedly 
different meaning are behaving contrary to law.122 Those precepts are 
substantially broader and less constricting than the intention-based 
animating principles that the original originalists—the “framers” of 
originalism, if you will—articulated as essential to the originalist 
enterprise. Subsequent originalists have been able to achieve 
agreement on the broad underlying principles, but they have often 
viewed as unduly narrow and mistaken the framing originalists’ 
understanding of how those principles must be put into action. 
Of course, agreement on broad principles does not necessarily 
produce one unified, coherent theory. For living constitutionalists, 
this insight has led to the conclusion that the Constitution is capable 
of sustaining many meanings, and that its broad animating principles 
are capable of supporting many rules.123 Similarly, the core principles 
upon which originalists agree are broad enough that one can fashion 
from them a stunning variety of constitutional theories. Agreement 
on the proposition that the Constitution must have a fixed meaning 
leaves plenty of room for disagreement about what that meaning is, 
and how and at what level of generality it is to be ascertained. The 
project of actualizing these capacious principles into a working theory 
 
popular method that can be called the ‘underlying principles’ approach. We discern from the 
text the deeper underlying principles that underlie its particular injunctions. We then appeal to 
these underlying principles to limit the scope of the text or ignore it altogether. Those who 
employ this approach can claim that they are still enforcing the Constitution, in the sense that 
they are implementing the principles for which it stands.”). 
 122. See Berman, supra note 21, at 22 (arguing that “[o]riginalism proper” is the view 
expressed by the Court in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905), that “[t]he 
Constitution is a ‘written instrument’” whose “meaning does not alter” but instead “means 
now” what it “meant when adopted”); Solum, supra note 105, at 3, 5, 12 (arguing that 
originalists of all stripes agree on the basic thesis that the Constitution’s meaning was fixed at 
the time of origin). 
 123. See Brennan, supra note 119, at 437 (“To remain faithful to the content of the 
Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text must account for . . . [its] 
substantive value choices and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to 
modern circumstances.”). 
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is a task that each generation of originalists has undertaken anew, 
occasionally drawing upon, but occasionally rejecting, the work of its 
predecessors. This, of course, sounds very much like the living 
constitutionalists’ view of the manner in which constitutional meaning 
evolves.124 
Thus, not unlike living constitutionalists, who have argued for 
evolving constitutional meaning on the ground that “[w]hat the 
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times 
cannot be the measure to the vision of our time,”125 originalists have 
pushed for changes in the working theories of originalism (in effect, 
the “meaning” of originalism) as academic understanding of 
constitutional and interpretive theory has deepened—and as they 
have come to believe that the “framers” of originalism were wrong 
about the interpretive implications of the broad, animating principles 
of the movement. For instance, originalism shifted to original 
meaning when it became clear that a jurisprudence of original intent 
was conceptually untenable126 and was no longer in accordance with 
contemporary interpretive values.127 
And, just as living constitutionalists have recognized that judges 
must not “turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew [adaptation] 
of overarching principles to changes of social circumstance,”128 and 
that “the genius of the Constitution rests . . . in the adaptability of its 
 
 124. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 9 
(1991) (“[T]he very meaning of the thing we call ‘the Constitution’ is a reality partly 
reconstructed by each generation of readers.” (emphasis omitted)); Brennan, supra note 119, at 
437 (“Successive generations of Americans have continued to respect these fundamental choices 
and adopt them as their own guide to evaluating quite different historical practices.”); Friedman 
& Smith, supra note 119, at 5–6 (“[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but 
the relevant history is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional 
history.” (emphasis omitted)); Robert M. Shrum, Tribute to Laurence Tribe, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 11, 12 (2003) (praising Laurence Tribe for recognizing that “the Constitution is 
not an historical artifact frozen in amber, but that its words have a living meaning, and that 
guarantees like ‘equal protection’ are an ongoing mandate for each generation to widen and 
realize the ideals of liberty and justice”). 
 125. Brennan, supra note 119, at 438. 
 126. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 127. When one steps back from questions of constitutional interpretation and considers 
interpretive theories more generally, one finds a familiar pattern of evolution. In the 1970s, 
when the modern originalist movement began, intentionalism was the prevailing approach to 
the interpretation of legal texts. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–23 (2006). It was not until the mid-1980s that textualist approaches to 
interpretation began their ascendancy. See id. at 23–29. The evolution in originalist thought that 
we have described here tracks this modern change in interpretive theory. 
 128. Brennan, supra note 119, at 436. 
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great principles to cope with current problems and current needs,”129 
originalists have reconstituted their working theories of originalism as 
they have been presented with new problems that were not 
contemplated by the “framers” of originalism. For example, because 
the mischief that brought the originalist movement into being was the 
liberal “activism” of the Warren Court, the early originalists focused 
on cabining judicial subjectivity and limiting judicial power.130 But as 
the federal courts became increasingly populated with conservative 
judges, the initial mischief that gave rise to the originalist movement 
faded considerably.131 Accordingly, originalist theories evolved to 
tackle new, previously ignored, and unforeseen problems that also 
implicate the core concerns of originalism,132 such as the 
incompatibility of a substantial number of precedents (decided long 
ago by nonoriginalist judges), and the incompatibility of many 
democratically enacted laws, with the original constitutional meaning. 
Many originalists thus changed their focus from seeking to limit 
judicial power in order to empower legislatures to seeking to expand 
judicial power in order to limit legislatures.133 Although this new focus 
is consistent with the broader values and principles that have always 
animated the originalist movement, it is wholly inconsistent with the 
particular “original meaning” of originalism as understood by the 
framers of the movement. 
In sum, “originalism,” despite what its pioneers believed, is 
capable of multiple meanings. Although in all of its various iterations 
it has always been grounded in certain general animating principles, 
originalist theory—the actual meaning of originalism—has evolved 
 
 129. Id. at 438. 
 130. See John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2003) (“The intuition, that judicial subjectivity was rampant and very 
bad, got Originalism Mark I going.”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 599–603 (“It is important to 
note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the 
recent and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely 
developed as a mode of criticism of those actions.”). 
 131. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 604 (“By the late 1980s, Ronald Reagan had 
significantly changed the complexion of the Court. . . . If conservative originalism was to remain 
relevant when its raison d’etre was gone, then it would have to change form.”). 
 132. Cf. Brennan, supra note 119, at 438 (“Time works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application 
than the mischief which gave it birth.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 
(1910))). 
 133. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 607–09 (“The primary virtue claimed by the new 
originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic 
majoritarianism.”). We discuss this point further in note 225, infra. 
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over time to correct mistaken assumptions, to broaden myopic 
visions, to keep up with evolving interpretive values, and to confront 
unforeseen threats. That evolution has not been linear; at any given 
time, there are countless competing versions of originalism. And 
there is every indication that originalism continues to evolve and 
splinter, now perhaps more than ever. Originalism—a movement 
born of contempt for the notion of a living constitution of evolving 
meaning—is itself a living, evolving approach to constitutionalism.134 
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that there is something 
inherently hypocritical about the fact that originalists insist that the 
Constitution must have a fixed meaning while simultaneously 
allowing the meaning of originalism itself to evolve. Although we 
have analogized the evolution of originalism to living 
constitutionalism, we recognize that originalism’s “constitution”—
that is, the core principles of originalist theory—lacks the features of 
this nation’s Constitution that prompt originalists to insist that the 
latter must have a fixed meaning; originalism’s constitution, unlike 
America’s, is not a written one and was never ratified in any 
particular form. Still, as we explain in Part III, originalism’s evolution 
does indeed undermine originalists’ claims, but not for reasons of 
hypocrisy. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISTS’ CLAIMS 
In one respect, this story of evolution reflects well on originalists. 
The proponents of any rigorous theory should, after all, constantly 
strive to improve it, to smooth out the bumps of incoherence. For 
most theories, this development is a virtue, a sign that its proponents 
are sufficiently humble to respond to criticism and to recognize the 
room for theoretical maturation while still holding on to their core 
principles. But for originalists, there is a twist: the central claims of 
their faith are to a substantial degree belied by the very existence of 
 
 134. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have also suggested that originalism has a living 
constitution. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2006). But their metaphor differs from 
ours. Post and Siegel distinguish the scholarly jurisprudence of originalism from the political 
practice of originalism. That is to say, although theoretical justifications for originalism focus on 
its apolitical nature, in practice originalism is used to rally political actors and to champion 
political outcomes. Thus, as the political commitments of the right change, the practice of 
originalism changes along with them. Originalists, claim Post and Siegel, selectively ignore or 
reinterpret the past to serve their evolving political agendas. It is in that sense that Post and 
Siegel speak of originalism as having its own living constitutionalism. See id. at 565. 
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this evolution and discord. Originalists have consistently insisted that 
they have discovered the one, true faith—the one approach that is 
self-evidently correct. Yet the faith, it seems, keeps changing. 
The contours of originalist methodology might be in flux, but 
originalists’ normative claims about the merits of their approach have 
been largely consistent since the ascendancy in the 1970s and 1980s of 
modern originalism. When we refer generically to “originalists” in 
making this assertion, we obviously are keenly aware that the 
originalist tent is a very large one—indeed, that insight is central to 
our point, as should be apparent from Part I. But the reach of the tent 
that we have in mind here is nonetheless not infinite. To borrow 
Mitchell Berman’s thoughtful taxonomy, we address here claims by 
“strong” originalists—that is, originalists who claim either (1) that 
“whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive 
inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning), 
that object should be the sole interpretive target or touchstone,” or 
(2) that “interpreters must accord original meaning (or intent or 
understanding) lexical priority when interpreting the Constitution but 
may search for other forms of meaning . . . when the original meaning 
cannot be ascertained with sufficient confidence.”135 Our quarrel is 
with these thinkers, whom Stephen Griffin has referred to as 
“exclusive originalists.”136 To the extent that there are other 
constitutional theorists who consider themselves originalists but do 
not hold these beliefs, our objections do not extend to them.137 
In this Part, we consider what originalism’s constant evolution 
and dissonance mean for originalists’ normative claims. Strong, 
exclusive originalists may come in all shapes and sizes, but they have, 
with remarkable (if not complete) consistency, made several 
 
 135. Berman, supra note 21, at 10. We might nuance this definition, as does Berman, see id. 
at 22 & n.49, to include originalists who are sometimes willing to afford stare decisis effect to 
nonoriginalist precedents that they believe to have been wrongly decided. See supra notes 106–
16 and accompanying text. We might also allow some room for “faint-hearted” originalists who 
are willing to depart from original meaning (or intent or understanding) to avoid profoundly 
immoral or unpalatable results in a very narrow category of extraordinary cases. See, e.g., Scalia, 
supra note 2, at 864 (“I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, 
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”). 
 136. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (referring 
to an approach that argues that originalism is “the only (or at least primary) legitimate method 
of interpretation” (emphasis omitted)). 
 137. Berman refers to these thinkers as “moderate originalists” or “weak originalists.” 
Berman, supra note 21, at 10–12. 
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sweeping claims about the normative superiority of their approach.138 
First, originalists contend that their methodology is the only 
theoretically coherent approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Second, originalists argue that because their approach accords to the 
Constitution a fixed and determinate meaning based on the 
document’s text, it is the only legitimate approach to constitutional 
interpretation—that is, the only approach that is consistent with both 
the Constitution’s status as law and the judiciary’s role in a 
democratic society. Third, originalists argue that their approach is 
uniquely promising for constraining the ability of judges to impose 
their own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. This 
Part recounts each of these claims in turn, largely in the originalists’ 
own words, and seeks to demonstrate that they are significantly 
undermined by the reality of originalism’s constant evolution and 
dissonance. 
A. Originalism and Theoretical Coherence 
To take them at their word, originalists believe that there are two 
categories of approaches to constitutional decisionmaking—
originalism and everything else—distinguished by their theoretical 
purity or lack thereof. We have in mind the familiar claim noted at 
the outset of this Article that originalism must prevail because (1) it 
takes a theory to beat a theory, and (2) after decades of trying, the 
nonoriginalists have been unable to agree upon an alternative. The 
thrust of this argument appears to be that the very fact that 
nonoriginalists cannot agree on an alternative theory is compelling 
evidence that no such legitimate theory is possible.139 As Justice Scalia 
 
 138. We recognize that not every strong originalist has defended originalism on a ground as 
aggressive as those described here. Notably, several prominent originalists have recently backed 
away from the claim that originalism is uniquely able to constrain judges. See, e.g., John 
Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 473, 473–76 (2008) (“I am deeply skeptical of the capacity of any methodology to 
constrain any interpreter and thereby to keep Americans from doing what they love to do, 
which is to find that their Constitution is good, and, therefore, contains what it needs to 
contain.”); infra note 225 and accompanying text. See generally Whittington, supra note 1, at 
608–09 (noting that in recent originalist writing “there seems to be less emphasis on the capacity 
of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge” and that new originalists are “unlikely to 
argue that only originalist methodology can prevent judicial abuses or can eliminate the need 
for judicial judgment”). Still, in its strong form, originalism is distinct among constitutional 
interpretive theories for the frequency with which its proponents have argued that it, and it 
alone, is the only acceptable method for interpreting the Constitution. 
 139. As Gregory Bassham articulates it, “[Justice] Scalia argues that originalism is superior 
to all nonoriginalist theories, because there is no agreement, and no prospect of agreement, 
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puts it, it is simply not possible to achieve “consensus on what, 
precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.”140 
Nonoriginalists, he argues, “divide into as many camps as there are 
individual views of the good, the true, and the beautiful,” which 
makes theoretical coherence among nonoriginalists a virtual 
impossibility.141 Randy Barnett has picked up on this theme, 
dismissing nonoriginalism on the ground that “the opponents of 
originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical 
alternative.”142 And when President Reagan’s Department of Justice 
 
about which version of nonoriginalism should be adopted in its place. Over the past few 
decades, a host of nonoriginalist theories have enjoyed their brief day in the sun, but none has 
been widely accepted. Only originalism, he argues, provides a clear, fixed standard upon which 
agreement is ultimately possible.” Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia’s Equitable Constitution, 33 
J.C. & U.L. 143, 149–50 (2006); see also James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, 
Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2006) (“As Scalia observed in his 
1989 essay, it is impossible to ‘discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists’ 
regarding the appropriate interpretive methodology. This remains true today. By their internal 
disagreement and their very diversity, nonoriginalists unwittingly bolster the originalists’ 
assertion that nonoriginalists are simply making it up as they go along.” (quoting Scalia, supra 
note 2, at 855)). 
  Lawrence Solum has suggested that Justice Scalia may not actually be making this 
argument at all. According to Solum, Scalia might instead simply be making the standard 
originalist argument that nonoriginalism’s flaw lies in the fact that (1) it necessarily relies on 
moral judgments, and (2) in a pluralist society there is no possibility of consensus on those 
matters, which (3) will inevitably lead judges to mistake their own views for constitutional 
mandate. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 336 (2008). If 
Solum is right, then Justice Scalia’s language is uncharacteristically inartful here, and we are 
mistakenly responding to a straw man. But other passages suggest that Scalia does indeed 
intend to make the argument to which we are responding. Consider the argument that he 
advanced in his other principal defense of originalism: 
Apart from the frailty of its theoretical underpinning, nonoriginalism confronts a 
practical difficulty reminiscent of the truism of elective politics that “You can’t beat 
somebody with nobody.” It is not enough to demonstrate that the other fellow’s 
candidate (originalism) is no good; one must also agree upon another candidate to 
replace him. Just as it is not very meaningful for a voter to vote “non-Reagan,” it is 
not very helpful to tell a judge to be a “non-originalist.” If the law is to make any 
attempt at consistency and predictability, surely there must be general agreement not 
only that judges reject one exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt 
another. And it is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists 
as to what this might be. 
Scalia, supra note 2, at 855. In addition, others have read Scalia as we do, and others have 
separately endorsed the argument that we believe Scalia to be making, see infra notes 140–45, so 
our response remains useful. In any event, if Solum’s reading is correct, then Scalia’s argument 
is still undermined by the diversity of originalist theories for the reasons set out in Part III.C. 
 140. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862–63. 
 141. Scalia, supra note 3, at 45; see also supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. 
 142. Barnett, supra note 5, at 617; see also id. (“The inability of the most brilliant and 
creative legal minds to present a plausible method of interpretation that engendered enough 
confidence to warrant overriding the text . . . make[s] . . . originalism much more attractive.”); 
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produced a “Sourcebook” of originalist claims, its authors asserted 
that “[a]lthough all [nonoriginalists] reject original meaning as 
relevant to constitutional interpretation”—hardly an obvious or 
accurate proposition, but that is another matter143—“there is no 
consensus among them as to an appropriate alternative standard.”144 
Indeed, this has been a constant refrain of originalists: that “one need 
spend no time worrying over [nonoriginalism’s] legitimacy or 
intellectual coherence because it pretends to neither.”145 
There was always something fishy about this it-takes-a-theory-to-
beat-a-theory argument. By dividing the world of constitutional 
interpretation into originalism and “nonoriginalism,” originalists have 
stacked the deck in their favor.146 One could easily make the same 
 
Raoul Berger, Response, “Original Intent”: A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 
1549 (1992) (“Even a Justice of the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, has entered the lists; after 
examining the voluminous literature and dwelling on the non-originalists’ failure to develop a 
theory acceptable to their fellows, he opted for originalism as the lesser evil.”); Berger, supra 
note 41, at 646 (“Justice Scalia considers it a grave defect of the nonoriginalists that they have 
been unable to agree upon an alternative theory.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 391 n.36 (2007) 
(defending originalism on the ground that “judges of various ideologies cannot be expected to 
reach agreement on any alternative method”); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in 
Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1474 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF 
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)) 
(“Nonoriginalism is, as an initial problem, not a positive constitutional theory: As Justice Scalia 
colorfully points out, it is united only in agreement that orignalism is not the right approach; it 
would substitute a bewildering array of proposals, yet agrees upon none. This difficulty is 
particularly troublesome in foreign affairs law.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 19, at 1086 (“Almost no one believes that the original 
understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.”); James E. 
Fleming, Response, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1849 (1997) 
(praising Michael Dorf for showing “that one can take original meaning seriously without being 
a narrow originalist”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (noting that “[v]irtually everyone agrees” that the text and original 
meaning matter in constitutional interpretation). 
 144. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 7. 
 145. Bork, supra note 18, at 393 (describing Paul Brest’s constitutional theory); see also id. 
at 387–88 (“The nature of the non-interpretive enterprise is such that its theories must end in 
constitutional nihilism and the imposition of the judge’s merely personal values on the rest of 
us. . . . Nihilism turns instead to advocacy of opportunistic judicial authoritarianism precisely 
because what fuels the non-interpretivist impulse in the first place is a desire to change society 
in ways that legislatures refuse. The desire for results is greater than the respect for process, 
and, when theory fails, power remains.”). 
 146. Over the years, some commentators have contended that “theoretically, there is no real 
distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism.” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as 
Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1602–03 (1989); see also MICHAEL PERRY, 
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 279–80 n.7 (1988) (“There is a 
sense in which we are all originalists: We all believe that constitutional adjudication should be 
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argument about any method of constitutional interpretation. It would 
be just as compelling to argue that common-law constitutionalism,147 
for example, must prevail because all of the many “non-common-
lawists”—including the diverse adherents to the various schools of 
originalism, along with a great many nonoriginalists of assorted 
stripes—are unable to agree upon an alternative. Indeed, one could 
come up with an entirely new (and entirely inane) theory of 
constitutional interpretation—say, that the Constitution should be 
interpreted by flipping a coin or by reading the stars—and then argue 
just as convincingly that the theory must prevail on the ground that 
(1) it takes a theory to beat a theory, and (2) all of the “non-coin-
flippers” or the “nonastrologers”—from original-intent originalists to 
common-law constitutionalists to original, objective-public-meaning 
textualists to believers in “constitutional moments”148—cannot even 
begin to agree on the proper alternative. 
But our account of the substantial diversity and frequent 
evolution in the originalist camp indicates that even if one allows the 
originalists to stack the deck by dividing the world of constitutional 
theory into originalism and nonoriginalism (rather than, say, 
“common-lawism” and “noncommon-lawism,” or “process-based 
theories” and “non-process-based theories”149), their argument that 
originalism must prevail because it takes a coherent theory to beat a 
coherent theory still holds no water. Intentionally or not, their binary 
taxonomy paints a highly misleading picture of a unified, cohesive 
originalist movement standing as one against a fractured, and thus 
theoretically incoherent, hodgepodge of alternative approaches.150 As 
 
grounded in the origin . . . . But there is a sense, too, in which none of us is an originalist . . . .”). 
The account we provide here in some sense strengthens that view. Our objective, however, at 
least for present purposes, is to take originalists’ claims as they make them. And to hear the vast 
majority of originalists tell it, there is a world of difference between originalism and 
nonoriginalism. But see Balkin, supra note 58, at 292 (arguing that the “debate between 
originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy”); Solum, supra note 105, at 
165–68 (arguing that some originalist theories are compatible with some theories of living 
constitutionalism). 
 147. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 143, at 885 (arguing that “the common law . . . provides the 
best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law”). 
 148. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
 149. Compare JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980), with Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). 
 150. See Brown, supra note 2, at 69–70 (“Even though there is no unanimity about what 
originalism actually means, or what it calls upon judges to do in a close case, its adherents gain a 
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we have sought to demonstrate, originalism is no more a single, 
intellectually coherent theory than is “nonoriginalism”; originalists 
cannot agree amongst themselves on constitutional interpretation, 
either. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: if the 
substantial disagreement among nonoriginalists is persuasive 
evidence that nonoriginalist theory is incoherent, then the substantial 
disagreement among originalists must be equally powerful evidence 
that originalist theory lacks coherence, as well. The reality of 
originalism’s internal discord should put an end to the ubiquitous 
argument that originalism is the only theoretically coherent approach 
to constitutional interpretation. 
B. Originalism and Theoretical Legitimacy 
Originalists’ claims to unique theoretical coherence, then, are 
(on their own terms) seriously undermined by the constant evolution 
in originalists’ thinking and the constant infighting among originalists 
about what their approach actually entails. But originalists do not 
stop there. Modern originalists have also consistently argued that 
originalism is not simply the only coherent theory, but also the only 
legitimate theory of constitutional interpretation.151 This claim is 
generally premised on assertions about the Constitution’s status as 
law and the judiciary’s role in a democratic system. Most defenses of 
originalism begin by noting that the originalist approach provides 
fixed, determinate, and objective constitutional meaning based on 
(some measure of) the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
Justice Scalia, for instance, has argued that originalism treats the 
Constitution as having “a fixed meaning ascertainable through the 
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law,”152 by 
“establish[ing] a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate 
from the preferences of the judge himself.”153 
 
great deal by sharing one name that offers the appearance, if not the reality, of agreement. They 
also gain the strategic advantage of claiming, by virtue of their name alone, the baseline from 
which departures must be justified.” (footnote omitted)). 
 151. See Post & Siegel, supra note 134, at 547 (“Critics of the Warren Court began to argue 
that determining the original understanding of the Constitution’s framers was the only 
legitimate way of interpreting the Constitution, and they began to denounce all other 
approaches to constitutional interpretation as improper and unprincipled.” (footnote omitted)). 
 152. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854. 
 153. Id. at 864. Lillian BeVier calls this the “impersonality” of originalism’s decisionmaking 
criteria, which she argues “invokes all the virtues of objectivity and by implication rejects 
subjective judging.” Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288 (1996); see also BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (“When we speak of 
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For this reason, proponents argue that originalism is the natural 
approach to interpreting a written Constitution. Keith Whittington, 
for example, distinguishes the United States’ written Constitution 
from the British reliance on practice and tradition, and he argues that 
“[f]ixing constitutional principles in a written text against the 
transient shifts in the public mood or social condition becomes 
tantamount to an originalist jurisprudence.”154 Originalists argue that 
their theory is the only one that is consistent with the view that the 
written Constitution is a form of law. After all, the Constitution 
itself—in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI—proclaims its status as 
authoritative law.155 And its status as supreme law “can emerge from 
the text as intended . . . only if the text has the fixed meaning it is 
uniquely capable of carrying.”156 
Originalists also note that judicial review is premised on the 
assumption that the Constitution is “the sort of ‘law’ that is the 
business of the courts.”157 Originalists argue that originalism flows 
naturally from this premise—indeed, “is a virtual axiom of our legal-
political system.”158 “The central premise of originalism . . . is that the 
text of the Constitution is law that binds each and every one of us 
until and unless it is changed through the procedures set out in 
Article V.”159 And to interpret written law is by definition to 
determine what the words originally meant—and thus always will 
mean.160 Accordingly, originalists argue, “[i]f the Constitution is to be 
 
‘law,’ we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change except through prescribed 
procedures. That statement assumes that the rule has a meaning independent of our own 
desires.”). 
 154. WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 53; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 291 (“In 
substituting a written Constitution and expressly providing for change by amendment, [the 
Framers] evidenced that they had created a ‘fixed’ Constitution, subject to change by that 
process alone.”). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1127–28 
(arguing that the Supremacy Clause mandates textualism as the only legitimate method of 
interpretation). 
 156. WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 56; see also id. at 55 (“[O]nly a fixed text can be 
adequately ratified, that is, legislated into fundamental law.”). 
 157. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854; see also Bork, supra note 30, at 824 (“Any intelligible view 
of constitutional adjudication starts from the proposition that the Constitution is law.”). 
 158. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1020. 
 159. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551 (1994); see also Bork, supra note 18, at 384. 
 160. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13 (“[T]he long-accepted rule for interpreting legal texts 
is to construe them to have the original public meaning that they had when they were enacted 
into law.”); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 159, at 552 (“The meaning of all such legal writings 
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considered more than simply a traditional political document . . . but 
instead is treated as an enactment of judge-enforceable law,” then 
judges must seek to determine the original meaning of the words or 
“to effectuate the intent of the authorized lawmakers.”161 Therefore, 
originalists argue, “[i]f we are to interpret, then . . . we must be 
originalists.”162 
Most sophisticated originalists do not rest this argument on the 
mere assertion that the Constitution, as law, must be interpreted as 
any other law—that is, to have a fixed meaning unless and until its 
text is formally amended. Michael McConnell, for example, argues 
“that there are two essential characteristics of any theory of 
interpretation under our Constitution, which follow from the function 
of constitutional interpretation in our system.”163 The first, as noted 
above, is that “the constitutional text must be treated as ‘law’”; the 
second is that “it must be understood as having its origins in the 
consent of the governed.”164 According to this view, the foundational 
notion of popular sovereignty requires originalist interpretation: if 
“[a]ll power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the 
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it,” 
 
depends on their texts, as they were objectively understood by the people who enacted or 
ratified them.”); Lawson, supra note 17, at 1823; Solum, supra note 105, at 40–60. 
 161. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 4 (“Once we recognize the importance of 
the Constitution to constitutional law, we must also acknowledge the importance of the 
Constitution’s original meaning to the Constitution.”); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 
59–60 (“[W]riting, especially legal writing, is a means of transmitting intent. . . . It can be certain 
that the founders did intend to convey meaning in writing the Constitution.”); Graglia, supra 
note 12, at 1023 (“Because the Constitution derived its legal authority only when it was ratified 
at state conventions, judges should take it to mean what it was understood to mean by the 
ratifiers or . . . the people they represented.”); id. at 1024 (“[I]nterpreting a document means to 
attempt to discern the intent of the author . . . .”). Jack Balkin makes a similar argument, albeit 
in a form probably not recognizable to most originalists and with strikingly different results. See 
Balkin, supra note 58, at 295 (“Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to the 
Constitution as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the text, 
understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text.”). 
 162. Whittington, supra note 1, at 612; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 4 (arguing 
that if we “take interpretation seriously . . . we [must] adopt an originalist approach to 
interpretation”); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1029 (“Originalism is less a philosophy than a 
definition of ‘interpretation,’ and a plainer, more conventional, or less esoteric definition does 
not seem possible.”). 
 163. McConnell, supra note 101, at 360. 
 164. Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 296 (“Substitution by the Court of its own value 
choices for those embodied in the Constitution violates the basic principle of government by 
consent of the governed.”). 
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then “[i]t follows that the Constitution should be interpreted in 
accordance with their understanding.”165 
Continuing the theme of popular sovereignty, originalists 
contend that originalism is the only approach “that permits our 
society to remain self-governing”166—that is, the only approach that is 
consistent with the judiciary’s proper role in a democratic society. 
Originalism is uniquely consistent with democratic government, they 
argue, because it ensures that judges will invalidate democratically 
enacted laws only when those laws conflict with the judgment of the 
supermajority that ratified the Constitution.167 Robert Bork, for 
example, argues that “only the approach of original understanding 
meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must 
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”168 Justice Scalia 
 
 165. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1132; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 59 (“The 
text is not simply a list of words but is the embodied will of the people.”); id. at 154 (“The 
fundamental basis for the authority of originalism is its capacity to retain a space for the popular 
sovereign.”); id. at 111–52 (arguing that a well-developed theory of popular sovereignty is an 
important theoretical basis for originalism). See generally Lash, supra note 115, at 1440 (noting 
“the most common and most influential justification for originalism: popular sovereignty and 
the judicially enforced will of the people”). Other originalists, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook 
and Randy Barnett, have made similar arguments based more explicitly on contract theory or 
on the Constitution’s “writtenness.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1998) (arguing that “the Constitution was designed and 
approved like a contract,” and that “contractarian views imply originalist . . . interpretation by 
the judicial branch”). Barnett, who concedes that contracts and Constitutions are different in 
important ways, also argues that a Constitution’s “writtenness,” like a contract’s, entails a 
commitment to originalism. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 629–36; accord BARNETT, supra note 
79, at 112 (“Short of making the claim of illegitimacy . . . we are bound to respect the original 
meaning of a text, not by the dead hand of the past, but because we today—right here, right 
now—profess our commitment to this written Constitution, and original meaning interpretation 
follows inexorably from this commitment.”); see also id. at 100–09. Barnett disagrees, however, 
with McConnell’s focus on popular sovereignty as a justification for adherence to the Founding 
generation’s Constitution, because “[u]nlike a contract . . . a constitution purports to govern 
even those who did not consent to it at the founding.” Barnett, supra note 5, at 637 (emphasis 
omitted); see also BARNETT, supra note 79, at 11–52 (arguing that the legitimacy of the 
Constitution is not based on a theory of popular sovereignty). 
 166. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 3. 
 167. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to 
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2004) (noting the originalist 
belief that “[a]lthough such original meaning will sometimes trump the will of current 
majorities, it is ultimately consistent with democracy because it reflects the will of engaged 
supermajorities”). 
 168. BORK, supra note 11, at 143. Bork argues that originalism is “crucial” if we are “to draw 
a sharp line between judicial power and democratic authority,” Bork, supra note 30, at 824, 
because an application of originalism means that “[e]ntire ranges of problems will be placed off-
limits to judges, thus preserving democracy in those areas where the Framers intended 
democratic government,” id. at 827; see also BORK, supra note 11, at 163–64 (“[In] its 
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similarly contends that originalism is uniquely “compatible with the 
nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system,” 
because “the purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to 
prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that 
the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally 
undesirable.”169 And Michael McConnell has argued that only 
originalism produces democratic legitimacy because “[w]hen a judge 
goes beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted . . . the 
judge has no democratic warrant.”170 
The necessary implication of these assertions about originalism’s 
unique compatibility with law and democracy is that any other 
approach to constitutional interpretation is effectively lawless and 
undemocratic. And originalists have been equally explicit on these 
points. Lillian BeVier argues that nonoriginalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation are characterized by “the absence of 
respect for (or even acknowledgement of) law as a constraint.”171 
Robert Bork contends that nonoriginalism is inconsistent with the 
notion that the Constitution is a form of law because the very concept 
of law “assumes that the rule has a [fixed] meaning independent of 
our own desires,”172 and nonoriginalism inevitably requires judges to 
rely on their own values in determining constitutional meaning.173 
And Michael McConnell argues that, if courts employ nonoriginalism, 
then the Constitution is not law in any meaningful sense, but instead 
is simply “a makeweight.”174 
 
vindication of democracy against unprincipled judicial activism, the philosophy of original 
understanding does better by far than any other theory of constitutional adjudication can.”). 
 169. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862 (emphasis omitted). 
 170. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1136; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 43 
(arguing that originalism supports democratic legitimacy); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1026 (“If 
the end is democracy, that end is served when judge-restraining originalism permits the results 
of the democratic process to stand.”). 
 171. BeVier, supra note 153, at 287. 
 172. BORK, supra note 11, at 143; see also Lund, supra note 94, at 1370 (arguing that “living 
constitutionalism . . . does not treat the Constitution as binding law”). 
 173. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 10 (1971); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1130 (“It is simply not consistent with 
the idea of the Constitution as binding law to adopt a hermeneutic of textualism that permits 
individuals to assign their own private, potentially idiosyncratic meanings to the words and 
phrases of the Constitution.”). 
 174. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1129. McConnell also argues that if a text must have 
determinate meaning to count as law, then nonoriginalism, which is characterized by a lack of 
objective standards, fails to treat the Constitution as law because embracing nonoriginalism is 
tantamount to accepting that multiple interpretations of the Constitution might be equally good. 
See McConnell, supra note 101, at 359 (“[W]e lawyers do not have the luxury of stating that 
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To originalists, it follows that if nonoriginalism does not treat the 
Constitution as law, then it must also fail the test of democratic 
legitimacy. Robert Bork maintains that “no argument that is both 
coherent and respectable can be made supporting [nonoriginalism] 
because a Court that makes rather than implements value choices 
cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic 
society.”175 Steven Calabresi contends that “[n]on-originalist judicial 
review severely distorts the allocation of powers that is central to the 
Constitution.”176 And former Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that 
nonoriginalism—which he called living constitutionalism—is simply 
“a formula for an end run around popular government.”177 
Central to the normative case for originalism, then, is not simply 
the claim that the originalist approach is legitimate, but also the claim 
that it is the only legitimate approach—that its alternatives are 
fundamentally illegitimate. Although the point should already be 
apparent, we belabor it for a moment longer to underscore just how 
aggressively—and sometimes smugly and hubristically—originalists 
have asserted their claims to unique legitimacy. Lillian BeVier, for 
example, argues that “[i]ntegrity characterizes a judicial process based 
on originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its 
alternatives.”178 (Among the other deficiencies of nonoriginalism, she 
says, are that it is “irredeemably hypocritical and essentially 
dishonest.”179) Michael McConnell is more polite, if only slightly more 
charitable; he argues that originalists “offer a principled justification 
for the pattern of decisions they favor: that judges should interfere 
with legislative decisions only when necessary to protect individual 
rights or structural principles genuinely derived from the text of the 
 
multiple interpretations [of the Constitution] are all ‘good.’”). This has been a common 
originalist claim. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 58 (“To give the words of the 
Constitution new meanings over time would deny both the value and risk of a system of written 
constitutions.”); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 438 (2007) (“If we do not seek to be faithful to the Constitution, we 
may be trying to improve the Constitution, but we are not trying to interpret it.”). 
 175. Bork, supra note 173, at 6; accord Bork, supra note 18, at 388 (“[N]on-intepretivism 
ends in nihilism [because] it has proved wholly unable to meet a condition most theorists have 
accepted as indispensable—consistency with democratic control of government.”); see also, e.g., 
McConnell, supra note 101, at 360 (arguing that any approach other than originalism leads to 
the conclusion that the Constitution embodies “principles that the people did not choose,” and 
that “such a holding has no democratic legitimacy”). 
 176. Calabresi, supra note 13. 
 177. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 706. 
 178. BeVier, supra note 153, at 286. 
 179. Id. at 287. 
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Constitution, as interpreted in light of history and tradition.” 
Nonoriginalists, in contrast, “have yet to propound a comparable 
theory.”180 
These criticisms are nothing new. Robert Bork made the same 
case more than thirty-five years ago,181 arguing that nonoriginalism 
fails the test of legitimacy because “[w]here constitutional materials 
do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled 
way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.”182 And without 
the constraint of constitutional text or history, he argued, “the judge 
has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the 
community judgment embodied in the statute. That, by definition, is 
an inadequate basis for judicial supremacy.”183 Justice Scalia has 
elaborated on this theme, arguing that the “principal theoretical 
defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with the very 
principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”184 And 
Michael Perry has argued that “[n]onoriginalist judicial review seems 
fundamentally antithetical to basic axioms of modern American 
political-legal culture.”185 
Thus, to take them at their word, originalists do not believe that 
there are some good and some bad methods of constitutional 
interpretation, with perhaps one that seems better than all the others. 
Rather, they start from the premise that there is a correct method of 
constitutional interpretation,186 from which it necessarily follows that 
 
 180. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387–88 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). 
 181. Bork argued that if the Supreme Court “does not have and rigorously adhere to a valid 
and consistent theory of majority and minority freedoms based on the Constitution”—by which 
he meant originalism—“judicial supremacy, given the axioms of our system, is, precisely to that 
extent, illegitimate.” Bork, supra note 173, at 4. 
 182. Id. at 8. 
 183. Id. at 10; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 371 (arguing that nonoriginalist 
approaches “convert the ‘chains of the Constitution’ to ropes of sand”). 
 184. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854. 
 185. Perry, supra note 46, at 687–88; see also Graglia, supra note 12, at 1044 (arguing that 
nonoriginalist approaches mean, “as a practical matter, that the judge is the lawmaker, and such 
review therefore cannot be legitimate unless the judge is authorized to be the lawmaker”—
which, of course, the judge is not). 
 186. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 101, at 359 (arguing that “we lawyers do not have the 
luxury of stating that multiple interpretations are all ‘good’”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 529 (1998) (reviewing JACK 
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1996)) (“Originalism’s advocates claim that it supplies the one, true 
interpretive method . . . .”). 
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all other methods of interpretation are not simply inferior, but also 
wrong. From the very beginning of the modern originalist movement, 
originalists of every stripe have insisted unfailingly that theirs is the 
one true constitutional faith—that only their approach is legitimate 
and coherent and properly respects the Constitution and the 
judiciary’s institutional role. To originalists, everything other than 
originalism is constitutional heresy; nonoriginalist approaches are not 
methods to interpret the Constitution at all, but rather are proposals 
“to replace the Constitution as our fundamental law.”187 Originalism, 
they believe, is the “only approach that takes seriously the status of 
our Constitution as fundamental law and that permits our society to 
remain self-governing.”188 
Yet when an originalist says that originalism is the only 
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, what he often 
appears to mean is that his particular brand of originalism (which he 
regards as the true form of originalism) is the only legitimate method 
of constitutional interpretation. To originalists like Raoul Berger and 
Bruce Fein, “the doctrine of original intent is the only legitimate 
judicial guide for constitutional jurisprudence.”189 To originalists like 
Saikrishna Prakash,190 Steven Calabresi,191 and Robert Bork, however, 
“only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that 
any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to 
possess democratic legitimacy.”192 To originalists like Justice Scalia, by 
contrast, the only form of constitutional interpretation that “take[s] 
the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously” is an approach that 
 
 187. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 66 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Lino 
A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 632 (1993) (arguing that 
nonoriginalists “are not seeking a different means of interpretation—there are no different 
means—rather, they are seeking to empower the Court to make constitutional law apart from 
the Constitution”). 
 188. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 3. 
 189. Bruce E. Fein, Comment, Original Intent and the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV. 196, 197 
(1987) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 364 (delineating the 
importance of “original intention”). 
 190. See Prakash, supra note 186, at 529 (citing Bork and arguing that uncovering the 
“public understanding” is “the one, true interpretive method”). 
 191. See Calabresi, supra note 13 (“It is legitimate for courts to decide [controversial] issues 
only when they are enforcing the Constitution as originally understood and ratified by the 
people.”). Calabresi has at other times suggested that original, objective-public-meaning 
originalism is the only legitimate method of interpreting the Constitution. See infra note 310. 
 192. BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (emphasis added). It was apparently of no moment that 
Bork made this assertion not long after insisting that “original intent is the only legitimate basis 
for constitutional decisionmaking.” Bork, supra note 30, at 823 (emphasis added). 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
2009] LIVING ORIGINALISM 281 
seeks the objective original meaning of the text.193 And to originalists 
like Vasan Kesavan, Michael Stokes Paulson, and Gary Lawson, the 
originalism that is the “single, ‘true’ method of constitutional 
interpretation” is “original, objective-public-meaning textualism”194—
which would have come as a shock to Raoul Berger and the other 
pioneers of the modern originalist movement. To each of these 
originalists, and to many others, it is not exactly that originalism 
simpliciter is the only legitimate method of constitutional 
interpretation; it is that each one’s particular version of originalism—
and, a fortiori, not any other version of originalism—is the only 
legitimate method.195 
 
 193. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862; see also Scalia, supra note 3, at 37–44 (rejecting the use of 
original intent in favor of discovering an objective original meaning for the purposes of textual 
analysis). 
 194. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129; accord id. at 1121 (arguing that the 
“interpretive project of determining the original public meaning of the Constitution” is “the 
only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document”); 
Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Doctor Seuss, 24 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381, 387 n.26 (2001) (opining that “this particular species of 
originalism is the correct way to interpret the Constitution”); Lawson, supra note 17, at 1834 
(“[T]he Constitution’s meaning is its original public meaning. Other approaches to 
interpretation are simply wrong.”). 
 195. Raoul Berger, for example, argued not only that original-intent originalism is the only 
legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, but also that a focus on the objective original 
public meaning is illegitimate. See Berger, supra note 100, at 353 (arguing that the “essence of 
communication” is for “the writer to explain what his words mean; the reader may dispute the 
proposition, but he may not insist in the face of the writer’s own explanation that the writer 
meant something different”). Michael McConnell, in contrast, has argued not only that original-
meaning originalism is the only legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation, see 
McConnell, supra note 180, at 2387–88, but also that original-intent originalism and original-
expected-application originalism are illegitimate, see McConnell, supra note 101, at 362 (arguing 
that these approaches are, as represented by the decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983), “subverting the principle of the rule of law”). Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes 
Paulsen have argued not only that the “interpretive project of determining the original public 
meaning of the Constitution” is “the only truly legitimate approach to the interpretation of the 
Constitution as a legal document,” Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1121, but also that 
original-intent originalism and original-understanding originalism are illegitimate, id. at 1132–
33. Paulsen has gone even further, deriding even other original-meaning originalists—including 
Justice Scalia and Robert Bork—as “would-be originalists” because they do not subscribe to his 
particular approach. Paulsen, supra note 83, at 289 n.2. Randy Barnett similarly has argued not 
only that original-meaning originalism is the only legitimate method of interpreting the 
Constitution, see Barnett, supra note 5, at 630, but also that those self-proclaimed original-
meaning originalists (in particular, Justice Scalia) who are willing to follow precedents that are 
inconsistent with the original meaning, or are unwilling to follow the original meaning of 
constitutional provisions that are insufficiently rule-like, simply are not originalists, and thus do 
not follow a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, see Barnett, supra note 67, at 13. 
And Gary Lawson has argued not only that original, objective-public-meaning originalism is the 
only legitimate approach to interpreting the Constitution, see Lawson, supra note 194, at 387 
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But there is something self-defeating in all of that. The claims 
about the unique—and exclusive—legitimacy of originalism wither 
when one considers the profound disagreement among originalists on 
questions central to the interpretive enterprise. The frequent 
originalist assertion that there is one and only one legitimate 
approach to constitutional interpretation—in Kesavan and Paulsen’s 
words, “a single, ‘true’ method of constitutional interpretation”196—
has a certain rhetorical pull if one imagines originalists as offering a 
unified, categorically distinctive approach to constitutional 
questions—an argument along the lines of, “Everyone else labors in 
the mistaken belief that there are no right answers, but we (and we 
alone) have figured out that there is a universal truth out there, and 
we know how to find it.” But that assertion is, at the very least, 
substantially less compelling when it becomes apparent that 
originalists themselves cannot even begin to agree on what their 
correct approach actually entails. The profound internal squabbling 
among originalists negates their self-assured claim that originalism is 
“almost self-evidently correct”197 and “so obvious that it should hardly 
need a name, let alone a defense.”198 
Of course, the mere fact that originalists disagree among 
themselves does not necessarily mean that they are all wrong—or that 
at least one of them is not actually right. It is possible that among the 
many competing versions of originalism lies the one “correct” and 
uniquely legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, just as it 
is possible that there is a correct moral philosophy and a correct 
answer to the question, “which was the greatest baseball team of all 
time?” But if fifty people with fifty different approaches all insist that 
their particular approaches are not merely the best but are also 
correct, and that all other approaches are not merely less desirable 
but also illegitimate and wrong, then one can have only so much 
confidence in any one of their claims. 
It is not simply the general claim to unique legitimacy that is 
substantially more difficult to take seriously when one considers the 
rapid evolution of originalist thought and the wide range of originalist 
 
n.26, but also that all “[o]ther approaches to interpretation”—including what he calls “original 
private meaning” originalism, which is tantamount to an approach that seeks the relevant 
audience’s subjective understanding of the text, see Lawson, supra note 17, at 1826–27, “are 
simply wrong,” id. at 1834. 
 196. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1129. 
 197. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1020. 
 198. Calabresi, supra note 13. 
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views that currently exist, but also originalists’ specific claims that 
their approach alone properly treats the Constitution as a form of law 
and properly limits the judiciary to its appropriate role in a 
democratic society. These claims start from the premise that 
originalism (and only originalism) treats the Constitution as having a 
fixed and determinate meaning.199 Yet the meaning that a committed 
originalist judge would find obviously turns on the particular brand of 
originalism that the judge applies. And over the last thirty-five years, 
that meaning has been anything but fixed. A judge committed to the 
originalist enterprise would once have invoked original intent, and 
would today have the freedom to choose from a smorgasbord that 
includes original intent and many other originalist approaches—
approaches that, in at least some important classes of cases, have the 
potential to produce starkly different meanings of the constitutional 
provision at issue, and thus to dictate starkly different outcomes. 
To take perhaps the most obvious example of originalists’ 
invoking divergent theories and reaching disparate results, consider 
the range of responses originalists have offered to Brown v. Board of 
Education.200 In the 1970s, Raoul Berger argued vigorously that, as a 
matter of original intent—which he claimed can easily be determined 
from the debates surrounding the drafting and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—Brown was incorrectly decided (although 
he also argued that this result obviously was undesirable as a political 
matter).201 
But Robert Bork relied on a different version of originalism to 
argue that Brown was correctly decided. Bork argued—first in 1971 
and then again in 1990—that, although the Fourteenth Amendment 
originally was intended and understood to permit segregated schools, 
Brown nevertheless was correct because the “purpose that brought 
the fourteenth amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality 
and segregation were mutually inconsistent,” even “though the 
 
 199. See Solum, supra note 105, at 4 (noting that “the claim that semantic content is fixed at 
the time of origin plays a crucial role in all (or almost all) of the normative justifications for 
originalism”). 
 200. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 201. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 117–33, 245 (arguing that “the framers had no intention 
of striking down segregation”); see also Raoul Berger, Activist Indifference to Facts, 61 TENN. L. 
REV. 9, 20–21 (1993) (highlighting that the decision to strike down segregation reflected neither 
original intent nor contemporary political will). 
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ratifiers did not understand that.”202 Bork thus viewed the original 
meaning at a very high level of generality—so high, in fact, that many 
commentators have observed that his approach is starkly inconsistent 
with most standard versions of originalism.203 
Perhaps troubled by the implications of discerning original 
meaning at such a high level of generality, Michael McConnell in the 
mid-1990s made a different originalist argument in favor of Brown: 
that Brown was in fact consistent with the original, narrow 
understanding of how the Fourteenth Amendment would actually 
apply to segregated schools. McConnell relied not on evidence of 
strictly contemporaneous framer and ratifier understanding—which 
would require reference to the debates of 1866–1868 on which Berger 
had relied—but instead on evidence of Republican responses to the 
proposed Civil Rights Act almost a decade later.204 
Steven Calabresi has indicated that he too believes that Brown 
was correctly decided, on what he calls “new originalist” grounds.205 
Although he has yet to develop that argument in detail, in a recent 
article, he (along with coauthor Sarah Agudo) sketches out one 
 
 202. BORK, supra note 11, at 82; accord Bork, supra note 173, at 14–15. Akhil Amar agrees 
with this reasoning. See Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals 
(and for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2126680/. 
 203. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 31, at 847 (“The difficulty with Bork’s principle is that it 
superimposes his view of ‘neutrality’ on the Framers’ intent. If the concept of the intent of the 
Framers is to have any coherent meaning, it must include the Framers’ idea of what lines can 
appropriately be drawn.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25 
(1997) (“If achieving ‘equality’ is the relevant intention, it would be equally originalist to say 
that the Fourteenth Amendment enacted Marxism, on the theory that equality and capitalism 
were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that.”); Ronald Turner, Was 
“Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 229, 262 (1995) (arguing that if originalists “wish to adhere to the Brown-is-right 
position, something must give; that something may be a total abandonment of the originalist 
analysis or a reformulation of originalism that results in a more flexible and broader conception 
of what originalism entails”). 
 204. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 1132–33 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding: 
A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233, 233 (1996) (defending Brown as 
consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 205. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1998) (stating that Brown “was warranted on textualist/originalist 
grounds”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and 
Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 655 n.138 (2006) (“For the record, I am working on an article 
arguing that Brown was rightly decided based on the correct original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, New Originalist 
Justification of Brown v. Board of Education (unpublished manuscript))). 
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possible argument for Brown based on objective original meaning. He 
argues that the fact that, by 1868, thirty-seven states guaranteed the 
right to public education in their state constitutions suggests that that 
right is one of the “privileges or immunities” protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.206 He further argues that the fact that 
thirteen states had constitutional clauses explicitly prohibiting the 
deprivation or unequal provision of privileges and immunities lends 
support to the argument, previously advanced by John Harrison,207 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
best understood as protecting against the enactment of laws that 
discriminate on the basis of race in the provision or protection of 
fundamental privileges or immunities.208 Putting those two points 
together, Calabresi explains, might “imply that a right to a public 
school education in 1868 was a privilege or immunity for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes as to which the states were not allowed to 
discriminate on the basis of race.”209 Rejecting original understanding 
in favor of original textual meaning, he concludes: 
The framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment may well 
not have understood that the Amendment outlawed segregation in 
education, but arguably that is precisely what it did. Obviously, it is 
the formal text of the Fourteenth Amendment that governs, and not 
the uncodified and erroneous ideas of the ratifiers of that text as to 
what it might mean.210 
Earl Maltz, however, has challenged the originalist propriety of 
Brown, relying on contemporaneous historical evidence of the 
“understanding” of “those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . during the earlier Reconstruction period” to 
conclude that Brown is incompatible with originalism.211 (A decade 
earlier, Maltz had made a similar argument relying on the 
unambiguous “inten[t]” of the “Framers of the fourteenth 
 
 206. See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108–11 (2008). 
 207. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1473–74 (1992). 
 208. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 206, at 96–97. 
 209. Id. at 110. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor 
McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 231 (1996). 
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amendment.”212) Similarly, John Harrison has at least hinted that 
Brown cannot be reconciled with the text of the Equal Protection 
Clause as understood at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.213 And Justice Scalia has allegedly acknowledged that 
Brown cannot be defended on originalist grounds.214 
It is not our objective here to referee these competing claims by 
originalists about the validity of Brown. Our point is that these 
originalists have not only drawn upon competing sources, but have in 
fact employed a wide range of inconsistent approaches to originalism 
itself—a wide variety of divergent constitutional theories—to reach 
diametrically opposing conclusions to one of the most significant and 
controversial questions of constitutional law. That fact suggests that 
considerable skepticism is warranted toward the claim that something 
amorphously called “originalism” is uniquely consistent with law and 
democracy because of its ability to produce a single, objective, 
unchanging constitutional meaning. 
And it is not just the issue of segregation that yields different 
results depending upon the version of originalism employed.215 The 
same is true of countless other major constitutional questions. Jack 
Balkin’s “text and principles” originalism vindicates Roe v. Wade,216 
whereas most originalist methodologies would reject it. Randy 
 
 212. See Maltz, supra note 31, at 846 (“[T]he historical record indicates unambiguously that 
the Framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to outlaw state-imposed segregation 
per se.”). 
 213. See John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 243, 254–55 (1996). We say “hinted” because Harrison does not directly 
answer the question. He does suggest, however, that if the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
ratified in 1954—the year that the Court decided Brown—it would have been far from clear 
whether, in light of support for Jim Crow laws in a large part of the country, it would have been 
understood to outlaw segregated schools, and he suggests, somewhat elliptically, that the same 
was true in 1866. See id. 
 214. See Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 
NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 54 (describing Justice Scalia’s response when asked about 
Brown’s inconsistency with originalism). But see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 
95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that segregation was inconsistent with the 
unambiguous textual meaning of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 215. It is certainly true that original public meaning, original understanding, original intent, 
and original expected application often tend to collapse into one another in practice. See Colby, 
supra note 35, at 581–82 & n.284, 598–99. But they can just as often produce starkly different 
outcomes, especially when one considers the many subsidiary theories that fall within the 
original-public-meaning tent. 
 216. See Balkin, supra note 58, at 311–36 (arguing that the text and underlying principles of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses support a 
constitutional right to abortion). 
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Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” originalism would protect a nearly 
infinite list of unenumerated constitutional rights,217 whereas Robert 
Bork’s narrow original-understanding originalism essentially rejects 
all unenumerated rights.218 Original, objective-public-meaning 
textualism yields a conclusion that Congress cannot strip the Supreme 
Court of appellate jurisdiction over particular constitutional issues, 
whereas original-understanding and original-expectations originalism 
yield the opposite conclusion.219 Original-expected-application 
originalism supports the constitutionality of legislative prayer, 
whereas other forms of originalism that seek to identify the principle 
embedded in the text do not.220 Justice Scalia’s particular version of 
expected-applications originalism supports the constitutionality of 
government-sponsored Ten Commandments monuments, whereas 
forms of originalism that seek to identify and vindicate the original 
purpose of the Establishment Clause do not.221 And so on. 
For a particularly timely example, consider District of Columbia 
v. Heller,222 the Supreme Court’s recent blockbuster Second 
Amendment case. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion employed 
original-public-meaning originalism, with an emphasis on the public 
understanding and ordinary meaning of the text at the time of the 
Framing, to conclude that the Second Amendment protects the right 
to own and carry a gun for confrontation.223 Justice Stevens’s dissent, 
by contrast, employed what is essentially an original intent 
methodology to conclude that the Second Amendment does not 
protect such a right.224 
 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
 218. See BORK, supra note 11, at 114, 118–19, 125 (characterizing judicial protection of 
unenumerated rights as an illegitmate attempt to bypass the legislative process). 
 219. Or so say Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 64, 
at 1015–25 (arguing that the text and structure of Article III establish that all federal judicial 
power must be subject to the final authority of the Supreme Court). 
 220. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 361–63. 
 221. See Koppelman, supra note 62, at 728–29, 733–40, 743–49. 
 222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 223. See id. at 2788, 2790–801, 2804–05; Solum, supra note 105, at 1–2. 
 224. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “there is no 
indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of 
self-defense in the Constitution”); id. at 2835 (arguing that the drafting history “sheds revelatory 
light on the purpose [and intent] of the Amendment”); id. at 2836–37, 2839 (arguing that the 
majority “gives short shrift to the drafting history of the Second Amendment,” and that the 
majority’s sources regarding the public understanding in the era after the Amendment went into 
effect are not helpful because those authors “appear to have been unfamiliar with the drafting 
history of the Second Amendment”); id. at 2841 (arguing that some of the majority’s sources 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
288 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:239 
C. Originalism and Judicial Discretion 
Finally (and obviously related to originalists’ claims about law 
and democracy), many of originalism’s proponents claim that their 
approach is uniquely capable of constraining judges’ ability to impose 
their views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.225 As 
 
“cannot possibly supply any insight into the intent of the Framers”). Perhaps not surprisingly, 
self-professed originalist commentators have disagreed about the propriety of the Justices’ 
approaches. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 94, at 1345 (“[T]he Court’s reasoning is at critical points 
so defective—and in some respects so transparently non-originalist—that Heller should be seen 
as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.”). 
 225. For the first thirty years of the modern originalist ascendancy, the “primary 
commitment” of the originalist project was to judicial restraint. Whittington, supra note 1, at 
602. Early originalists, after all, offered the approach as an antidote to the perceived judicial 
excesses of the Warren Court. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 363–72 (asserting that a focus on 
the Framers’ “original intention” is necessary to prevent “unbounded judicial interpretive 
discretion”); Harrison, supra note 130, at 83–86 (explaining that early originalists believed the 
Warren Court’s decisions were a product of the Justices’ “own views of desirable results” rather 
than neutral legal principles). These originalists claimed that originalism would both limit the 
opportunities of judges to displace the judgment of democratically elected officials, see, e.g., 
Bork, supra note 173, at 11 (asserting that “where the Constitution does not speak,” decisional 
authority is with legislative majorities), and, by narrowing the focus of judicial inquiry to the 
original meaning of the Constitution (or intent of its Framers), limit the discretion of judges to 
impose their personal, subjective views of good policy, see, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 863–64 
(“Originalism . . . establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the 
preferences of the judge himself.”). More recently, however, many originalists have tended to 
downplay the arguments about the dangers of judicial authority, insisting not that judges should 
“get out of the way of legislatures” but instead simply that judges must “uphold the original 
Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.” Whittington, supra note 1, at 609. These 
new originalists often have argued for more, not less, judicial interference with the work product 
of democratically elected officials. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 79, at 259–69 (arguing for the 
abandonment of the presumption of constitutionality traditionally afforded to government 
actions); Balkin, supra note 58, at 311–36 (arguing that originalist methodology justifies Roe v. 
Wade). Still, even if there is disagreement among originalists about the general desirability of 
judicial invalidation, in the name of the Constitution, of the output of democratic processes, 
originalists regularly contend that originalism, by limiting the judicial role to a fixed historical 
baseline, is substantially more likely than other approaches to constrain the ability of judges to 
impose their views under the guise of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 
11, at 163 (“Many cases will be decided as the lawgivers would have decided them, and, at the 
very least, judges will confine themselves to the principles the lawgivers intended.”); Scalia, 
supra note 2, at 863–64 (“[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation . . . is that the judges will 
mistake their own predilections for the law. . . . Nonoriginalism . . . plays precisely to this 
weakness. . . . Originalism does not . . . for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually 
quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”); Calabresi, supra note 13. Even those 
originalists who have recognized that claims of originalism’s constraining power have often been 
overstated have tended to view originalism as nonetheless meaningfully, even if not completely, 
constraining. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 89–99, 204–06; Amar, supra note 46, at 
53–54 (“[Originalism] aims not to constrain more, but to constrain better, by focusing judges on 
America’s most attractive legal norms as a matter of prestige and substance.”); Barnett, supra 
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Steven Smith explains, “A central concern of originalism is that 
judges be constrained by the law rather than be left free to act 
according to their own lights, a course that originalists regard as 
essentially lawless.”226 This claim proceeds from the premise that only 
originalism uses an objective criterion that is “exterior to the will of 
the Justices”227—that is, some measure of the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s text—to produce a fixed and determinate meaning. As 
Keith Whittington explains, originalists have argued that if the 
“political seduction of the law” is the principal threat from judicial 
review, then “the best response” is to “lash judges to the solid mast of 
history.”228 Justice Scalia argues that for this reason, originalism is 
“less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system 
of judicial review”—that is, that “the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law.”229 And Robert Bork has argued that with 
its “attempt to adhere to the principles actually laid down in the 
historic Constitution,” adoption of the originalist methodology “will 
mean that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits 
for judges.”230 
Originalists contend, moreover, that nonoriginalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation not only fail to constrain judges, but also 
effectively invite judicial instrumentalism under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation. Whereas “the textualist-originalist 
approach supplies an objective basis for judgment that does not 
 
note 67, at 23 (arguing that the Constitution’s broader provisions require some judicial 
discretion, but are constrained by the original public meaning of their terms). 
 226. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 (1989). 
 227. Bork, supra note 173, at 6. 
 228. Whittington, supra note 1, at 602. Whittington has argued, however, that “[j]udicial 
restraint is an inadequate basis for justifying an originalist jurisprudence,” because 
“[o]riginalism requires deference only to the Constitution and to the limits of human 
knowledge, not to contemporary politicians.” He also doubts whether originalism can “provide 
the type of restraints on judicial decision making favored by some of its advocates.” 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 47, at 4. 
 229. Scalia, supra note 2, at 863. Justice Scalia argues that originalism is more likely to 
create judge-constraining rules rather than standards that confer discretion. See Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–80 (1989); cf. McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 142, at 385 (arguing that the “most common defense of originalism” is 
that it “generally ties judges to rules”). 
 230. BORK, supra note 11, at 163; see also BERGER, supra note 31, at 284–86; BeVier, supra 
note 153, at 291 (“[T]he criteria of originalism constrain all the participants in the game—
including, most especially, the referees.”); Bork, supra note 30, at 826 (“The only way in which 
the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges interpret the document’s words according 
to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various 
amendments.”). 
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merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance,” Michael 
McConnell argues, “constitutional interpretation based on the judge’s 
own assessment of worthy purposes and propitious consequences 
lacks that objectivity.”231 Because nonoriginalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation are not limited by the original meaning 
of the constitutional text, originalists argue, judges applying them are 
free to rely on an infinite number of sources and even ultimately their 
own conceptions of the public good.232 And “[b]ecause these 
alternative standards are so vague, [they] often lead[] to the 
imposition of the judge’s personal concept of prudent public 
policy.”233 Justice Scalia argues that “[n]onoriginalism, which under 
one or another formulation invokes ‘fundamental values’ as the 
touchstone of constitutionality,” by definition increases the risk that 
judges will “mistake their own predilections for the law,” because 
“[i]t is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those 
political values that he personally thinks most important, and those 
political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’ Thus, by the 
adoption of such a criterion judicial personalization of the law is 
enormously facilitated.”234 Lino Graglia puts it less charitably: he 
argues that the “justification for judicial disallowance of political 
choices—that the judges are enforcing the Constitution—is not 
available” to nonoriginalists, “for they are by definition enforcing 
something other than the Constitution.”235 Indeed, many originalists 
not only think that nonoriginalist approaches are unlikely to constrain 
judges, but also doubt that nonoriginalists even have any interest in 
constraining judges.236  
 
 231. McConnell, supra note 180, at 2415. 
 232. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 370 (“If the Court may substitute its own meaning 
for that of the Framers it may . . . rewrite the Constitution without limit.”); Lund, supra note 94, 
at 1369–70 (arguing that living constitutionalism “simply replaces the written Constitution with 
the political preferences of contemporary judges”). 
 233. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 1; see also id. at 7 (“[A]ll non-
interpretivist theories . . . provide no substantive guidance and can easily be manipulated by the 
very people they purport to constrain, federal judges.”). 
 234. Scalia, supra note 2, at 863. 
 235. Graglia, supra note 12, at 1025. 
 236. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 1 (“In effect, non-interpretivists 
argue that life-tenured federal judges should have free rein to decide policy issues that affect 
virtually every aspect of our society, restrained by neither the text of the Constitution nor the 
electorate.”); Graglia, supra note 12, at 1032 (“What is wrong with originalism, its opponents 
believe, what provides the fundamental impetus for their search for alternative, is simply that it 
leaves too little for courts to do.”). 
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These claims of originalism’s unique capacity for judicial 
constraint are, however, substantially undercut by the reality of 
originalism’s rapid evolution and long-standing fragmentation. Many 
commentators have argued, quite persuasively in our view, that even 
assuming that there is such a thing as a standard, correct originalist 
approach, originalism—whichever version is canonized—is unlikely in 
most important cases effectively to constrain judges.237 In fact, 
commentators have suggested, originalists remain largely 
unconstrained in practice, for at least three reasons. First, originalists’ 
claims about the constraining effect of their approach break down 
when one recognizes that originalists—particularly judges who 
purport to be originalists—sometimes selectively choose not to 
employ originalism at all.238 Second, originalists’ claims about judicial 
 
 237. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 10–11 (explaining that historical ambiguities make 
it difficult to establish a fixed constitutional meaning); Colby, supra note 35, at 586–99 (“In the 
cases in which the fear of judicial discretion is most acute, judges cannot render their decisions 
on the basis of the original public meaning of the Constitution for the simple reason that there 
never was such a meaning.”); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the 
Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 397 (1989) (“Because there 
were many framers with differing intentions, it is impossible to determine with much specificity 
what policies and programs were intended by those who made our Constitution in 1787 or 
remade it in 1865-70.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of 
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (explaining that originalism is less 
likely to result in judicial restraint than a system of precedent because originalism provides a 
smaller body of norms, uses sources that are less accessible, and requires skills that are less 
compatible with those of a typical judge); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 282–86 (2004) (“The 
fact that the historical record is susceptible to . . . conflicting interpretations means that there is 
significant room for judges to slant the historical record to serve instrumentalist goals.”). 
 238. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 101 (1991) (arguing 
that Robert Bork “insists on 100% original understanding, 20% of the time”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 
385 (2000) (“Justice Scalia’s . . . jurisprudence of ‘original meaning’ . . . is . . . one that Justice 
Scalia uses selectively when it leads to the conservative results he wants, but ignores when it 
does not generate the outcomes he desires.”); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An 
Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 133 (2002) (concluding on the basis of 
an empirical examination of Supreme Court opinions that “Justices might speak about following 
an ‘originalist’ jurisprudence, but they only appear to do so when arguments about text and 
intent coincide with the ideological position that they prefer”); Ira C. Lupu, Employment 
Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260 
(1993) (“Justice Scalia, the author of [Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)], 
claims to be an originalist. Smith shows no signs, however, of any such orientation; the Court’s 
opinion totally ignores both the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause.” (footnote 
omitted)); Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional 
Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 969–71 (1999) (arguing that, in cases involving takings, 
free exercise, standing, and affirmative action, “Justice Scalia departs radically from his chosen 
theory when it suits his fancy”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism 
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constraint are overblown because, when they do choose to employ 
any particular form of originalism, originalists can, whether 
consciously or subconsciously, pick and choose among the various 
and often conflicting sources of original meaning (or understanding 
or intent) to produce the substantive results with which they 
personally agree.239 Third, originalism often fails to constrain judges 
because the process of applying the original meaning (or 
understanding or intent) to the particular problem at hand still leaves 
room for substantial discretion on the part of the judge to follow her 
personal preferences—especially when that meaning (or 
understanding or intent) is articulated at a broad level of generality.240 
We do not seek to diminish these critiques, which we find quite 
convincing. Instead, we seek to add another reason to suspect that 
originalism is far from the constraining influence that its proponents 
claim. The judicial-constraint defense of originalism turns on the 
premise that originalism “establishes a historical criterion that is 
conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge 
himself.”241 But in reality, there is a dizzying array of originalisms, 
each of which establishes a different “historical criterion.” 
Accordingly, a judge who seeks to answer difficult questions of 
constitutional meaning by invoking originalism in fact has significant 
discretion to choose (consciously or subconsciously) the version of 
originalism that is most likely to produce results consistent with his 
own preferences. 
Indeed, that is precisely what originalist judges have done. Even 
those self-professed originalists on the bench who have claimed to 
endorse one particular brand of originalism, to the exclusion of all 
 
Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 427–28 (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia’s “votes to 
overturn flag burning laws, hate speech laws, and affirmative action programs cannot be 
reconciled with a strictly originalist approach to constitutional interpretation”). 
 239. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 437, 437–41 (1996); Smith, supra note 237, at 279–86 (“Faced 
with . . . indeterminacies [in historical materials], judges might be tempted—either consciously 
or subconsciously—to read the history in a manner that advances their own preferences.”); cf. 
Koppelman, supra note 62, at 749 (“Since the conclusions of historical scholarship shift over 
time and since the judges are not constrained by the fact that a conclusion reached by some 
scholar at some time has since been refuted, the consequence is to expand the field of judicial 
discretion by presenting judges with a broad menu of possible interpretations, each of which 
have [sic] sufficient originalist credentials to qualify for citation in the U.S. Reports.”). 
 240. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 35, at 600 (“[T]he higher the level of generality, the more 
indeterminate the . . . originalist inquiry will be, and thus the less capable orignalism will be of 
fulfilling its promise to constrain judicial discretion.”). 
 241. Scalia, supra note 2, at 864 (emphasis added). 
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others, have in fact bounced around among originalist theories from 
case to case, each time choosing the version of originalism that allows 
them to reach their desired results. This point can be illustrated by 
reference to the jurisprudence of the three most influential originalist 
judges: Justices Scalia and Thomas and Judge Bork. 
We begin with Justice Scalia—the most outspoken and revered 
of originalist judges. Despite his strident claims to follow a consistent 
constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Scalia has in fact drifted among 
various versions of originalism.242 
Consider his approach to the Eleventh Amendment and the 
question of state sovereign immunity. The Court’s recent decisions in 
this area are, of course, all but impossible to square with either the 
text of the Amendment243 or (most commentators have concluded) its 
history.244 Justice Scalia has acknowledged that “[i]f this text were 
intended as a comprehensive description of state sovereign immunity 
in federal courts,” then many of the Court’s decisions in this area 
 
 242. He has also sometimes abandoned originalism altogether. See supra note 238. 
 243. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. The Court, however, has concluded that the states are protected from suits 
in federal court brought by their own citizens seeking to recover on claims arising under federal 
law, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and, more recently, that states are even immune 
from private suits filed in state court, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See generally John 
F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989). 
 244. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1279–80 
(1978) (explaining that, as indicated by historical materials, sovereign immunity survived as a 
common law doctrine but could be legislatively abrogated); William A. Fletcher, A Historical 
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of 
Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130 (1983) 
(“[T]he adopters of the amendment originally had the more modest purpose of requiring that 
the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal 
courts only when a state sued an out-of-state citizen.”); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 
(1983) (“Neither federal question cases nor admiralty cases fit within [the Amendment’s] 
language, within the intention of its framers, or within the interpretation that the Court 
consistently gave it prior to the constitutional crisis of 1877.”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme 
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 55 (1988) 
(“[T]he historic purpose of the Eleventh Amendment . . . suggests that the primary objective of 
the . . . Amendment was to ensure that the Constitution not be construed to permit an 
adjudication against a state, where suit was (1) based only on liabilities arising under state law, 
and (2) brought originally in a federal forum whose jurisdiction was not subject to legislative 
change or direction.”). 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:239 
would be “unquestionably” wrong.245 But he nevertheless has 
endorsed the Court’s decisions on the ground that an unwritten 
“assumption” of state sovereign immunity “was implicit in the 
Eleventh Amendment.”246 To be sure, that approach is not inexorably 
inconsistent with an originalist jurisprudence, which Justice Scalia 
claimed to have employed in reaching his conclusion.247 It might well 
follow (assuming the correctness of the history upon which it is 
based) from an original intent or original understanding approach. 
But it certainly is in substantial tension with the particular version of 
original-meaning originalism that Justice Scalia generally professes to 
follow—a version that relies on the primacy of constitutional text in 
the quest for constitutional meaning, and that treats the objective, 
“original meaning of the text” as the touchstone of original 
meaning.248 In the abstract (and in other contexts), Justice Scalia has 
insisted that, when it comes to constitutional interpretation, “[w]ords 
do have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes 
beyond” the “limited range of meaning” that words carry is 
“permissible.”249 Indeed, he has condemned interpretations that the 
constitutional “language will not bear.”250 Yet when it comes to 
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, he reaches a result (one 
generally preferred by political conservatives251) that cannot be 
squared with, and is admittedly not limited by, the constitutional text. 
Similarly, Justice Scalia has adamantly asserted that, because 
what should matter to originalists is the original objective meaning of 
 
 245. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 246. See id. at 32–33. 
 247. See id. at 34. 
 248. Scalia, supra note 3, at 38; see also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 
2788 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’ Normal meaning may of 
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not 
have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” (quoting United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))). 
 249. Scalia, supra note 3, at 24. 
 250. Id. at 37. 
 251. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 484 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s sovereign immunity 
decisions are part of a broader agenda for the protection of a conservative vision of 
constitutional federalism.”); Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative 
Critique of the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2003) (“[M]any 
conservatives cheer on — or do not criticize — the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, perhaps because it resonates with a pro-federalism policy agenda.”). 
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the text, rather than the subjective understandings of the Framers, 
historical sources such as The Federalist should be used to determine 
the common, objective meaning of the words used in the 
Constitution, not to ascertain the actual, subjective understanding of 
the Framers.252 But he has not always been faithful to that assertion. 
In Printz v. United States,253 for example,254 Justice Scalia’s opinion for 
the Court concluded that the federal government lacks authority to 
compel state officials to implement federal law, even though he found 
“no constitutional text speaking to this precise question,”255 and even 
though the most relevant constitutional text—the Commerce Clause, 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause (and 
even perhaps the truistic Tenth Amendment)—appeared to cut 
against his conclusion.256 Justice Scalia’s opinion relied heavily on The 
Federalist not to determine the original meaning of the text, which he 
concluded was all but irrelevant, but rather to ascertain “the historical 
understanding and practice” of the Framers.257 Indeed, Justice Scalia 
was so focused on the actual understandings of the Framers that he 
went as far as to discount almost entirely the views that one Framer 
expressed in The Federalist—concluding that Hamilton was too 
nationalistic to be trusted—and to rely instead on another Framer’s—
Madison’s—particular understanding of the Constitution.258 
Moreover, in his academic writing, Justice Scalia has claimed to 
reject the original-expected-application approach to originalism—the 
notion that the Constitution must be interpreted to reflect the actual 
expectations of the Framing generation as to how it would apply to 
particular practices. In a response to Ronald Dworkin, Justice Scalia 
explained that he follows what Dworkin calls “semantic intention” 
 
 252. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 38. 
 253. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 254. For additional examples, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the 
Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 
298 (2005). One such case is United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001), in which Justice Scalia 
cited The Federalist to determine what “the Framers . . . had . . . in mind” and what they 
“believed” about the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 255. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 256. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not 
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1307 (1998). 
 257. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905; see also Eskridge, supra note 256, at 1305 (“To determine the 
historical understanding and practice, Scalia relied strongly on The Federalist.”). 
 258. Eskridge, supra note 256, at 1307 & n.38. William Eskridge explains that Justice Scalia 
was using The Federalist to establish that the Constitution “as specifically understood by at least 
one framer” dictated the Court’s conclusion. Id. 
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(and what Justice Scalia would call “semantic import”—that is, “what 
the text would reasonably be understood to mean”) and not the 
“concrete expectations of the lawgivers.”259 Although he suggested 
that sometimes an original-expected-application approach will yield 
the same result as an original-objective-meaning approach, he 
concluded that only the latter approach is the proper one.260 On the 
bench, Justice Scalia has indeed sometimes rejected an expectations 
approach.261 
But at other times, he has in fact employed such an approach—
both in his academic writing and in his decisionmaking on the bench. 
To take the most familiar example, Justice Scalia has argued that 
capital punishment cannot violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because its wide use at 
the time of the Framing indicates that the Framers did not expect or 
understand the Eighth Amendment to prohibit it.262 He has also 
employed original-expected-application originalism, in the version 
that Andrew Koppelman has labeled “I Have No Idea 
Originalism,”263 in the many cases in which he has sought to determine 
the constitutionality of a particular practice by asking whether the 
Framing generation engaged in the practice shortly after ratification, 
on the theory that this practice demonstrates authoritatively that the 
Framing generation did not seek to prohibit the particular practice. 
For instance, he used this approach in concluding that the 
Establishment Clause allows government-sanctioned displays of 
religion,264 and he used the converse approach—treating the absence 
of a particular form of practice as strong evidence that the Framing 
generation believed that the Constitution prohibited the particular 
 
 259. See Scalia, supra note 106, at 144. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379, 
382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have been 
considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps . . . it is only since that time that concealed weapons 
capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach have become 
common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”). 
 262. See Scalia, supra note 106, at 145–46 (“[I]t is entirely clear that capital punishment, 
which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the Eighth 
Amendment.”); see also Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 279–82, 296–97 (2002). 
 263. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 264. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885–905 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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practice—in concluding that the federal government lacks the 
authority to compel state executive officials to implement federal 
law.265 In these instances, Justice Scalia does not seek to determine the 
original meaning of the Constitution. He instead places dispositive 
weight solely on the actual narrow expectations of the Framing 
generation.266 
In sum, Justice Scalia might insist that original-meaning 
originalism is the only legitimate approach to constitutional 
interpretation, but his application of originalist methodology has not 
been a consistent story of fidelity to a particular version of original-
objective-meaning originalism. Rather, he has sometimes employed 
versions of originalism that he has otherwise criticized in order to 
reach results that appear to be consistent with his personal 
preferences, but not with the version of originalism that he generally 
endorses. This is not to say that Justice Scalia always, or even usually, 
departs from a strict adherence to his original-objective-meaning 
approach, but he has done so frequently enough that one must 
question whether originalism is quite the constraining tool that its 
proponents—principal among them Justice Scalia himself267—claim 
that it is. 
And Justice Scalia is not the only originalist judge who has 
tended to drift among the various iterations of originalism. Robert 
Bork, the academic-originalist-turned-judge-turned-social-critic, has 
also done so. First, as we described above, Bork shifted from original-
intent originalism to original-understanding originalism.268 Of course, 
that move might simply reflect the same genuine intellectual 
evolution that characterized much of the originalist movement in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. But Bork never actually expressly 
acknowledged the shift, instead simply declaring, as he had previously 
 
 265. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–10 (1997). 
 266. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten 
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1132–38 
(2006) (arguing that it is virtually impossible to articulate an original objective meaning of the 
Establishment Clause that would account for Justice Scalia’s theory of the extent of the 
government’s power to endorse religion—a theory that is based entirely on his understanding of 
the expectations of the Framing generation and that eschews any effort to articulate the original 
meaning of the Clause); Koppelman, supra note 62, at 737–38 (arguing that Scalia’s originalism 
“does not attempt to state the principle for which the disputed constitutional provision stands”). 
 267. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 863 (arguing that originalism is “less likely to aggravate the 
most significant weakness of the system of judicial review and more likely to produce results 
acceptable to all”). 
 268. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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for original-intent originalism,269 that only the approach that he 
eventually embraced was constitutionally legitimate.270 Indeed, as 
James Boyle has noted, Bork simply lifted language from his earlier 
writing in support of original intent originalism and replaced all 
references to intent with references to “understanding,” an approach 
that Boyle describes as “‘search and replace’ jurisprudence.”271 
Second, even accepting that the shift to original understanding 
represented a genuine intellectual evolution, Bork has varied the 
level of generality at which he seeks the original understanding, 
depending upon the question at issue. When the question is whether 
the original understanding embraces a constitutional right to 
privacy—a question to which an affirmative response could validate 
the Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut272 and Roe v. Wade, 
among other cases that defy his policy preferences—Bork seeks the 
original understanding at a very high level of specificity.273 He rejects 
Griswold and Roe on the ground that contraception is not “covered 
specifically or by obvious implication by any provision of the 
Constitution”274 and “the right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is 
not to be found in the Constitution.”275 
Bork disdains the historical evidence that John Hart Ely,276 
among others, has provided to substantiate the claim that the original 
understanding of the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was that they 
protected unenumerated fundamental rights,277 insisting instead on 
more specific evidence that the ratifiers sought to command judges to 
“abandon clause-bound interpretation” in order to “create 
 
 269. Bork, supra note 30, at 823 (asserting that “original intent is the only legitimate basis for 
constitutional decisionmaking” (emphasis added)). 
 270. BORK, supra note 11, at 143 (asserting that “only the approach of original 
understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in 
order to possess democratic legitimacy” (emphasis added)). Bork claimed that his endorsement 
of original understanding was simply a clarification of his earlier work. See id. at 144. 
 271. James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 263, 283–90 (1991). 
 272. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 273. Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and 
the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1082–85 (1990) (arguing that 
Bork’s demand for such specificity for the right to privacy is actually inconsistent with the 
originalist methodology that he outlines in his book). 
 274. BORK, supra note 11, at 258. 
 275. Id. at 112; see also id. at 100, 113–16, 118–19, 257. 
 276. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22–30, 34–41 (1980). 
 277. See BORK, supra note 11, at 166, 177–85 (questioning Ely’s conclusions). 
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unmentioned rights by an unspecified method.”278 Because such 
evidence is, not surprisingly, elusive, Bork concludes that the 
Constitution does not create a right to privacy.279 
But his approach is quite different when he seeks to discern the 
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, at least with 
respect to the question of racial segregation. As noted above, Bork 
argues that the Constitution is properly read to prohibit racial 
segregation because, notwithstanding the particular views of the 
ratifiers about segregation at the time, the “purpose that brought the 
fourteenth amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality and 
segregation were mutually inconsistent”—and this is the kicker—
even “though the ratifiers did not understand that.”280 Bork, of course, 
cannot be faulted for recognizing, as have many others,281 that 
originalism will fail to win adherents if it requires the politically 
unpalatable conclusion that Brown was wrongly decided.282 But when 
he chooses to employ an extremely high-level-of-generality version of 
originalism in addressing the segregation question, he abandons the 
narrower originalism that he applies to the question whether there is 
 
 278. Id. at 181–82. 
 279. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391–97 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984); BORK, supra 
note 11, at 118 (rejecting unenumerated rights because they are not specifically listed in the text 
of the Constitution); cf. Robert H. Bork, Commentary, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare 
Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695–97 (“I represent that school of thought 
which insists that the judiciary invalidate the work of the political branches only in accordance 
with an inference whose underlying premise is fairly discoverable in the Constitution itself.”). 
 280. BORK, supra note 11, at 82; see also Bork, supra note 173, at 14 (“[Although] the men 
who put the amendment in the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court should secure 
against government action some large measure of racial equality . . . . those same men were not 
agreed about what the concept of racial equality requires.”). 
 281. Because Brown occupies a position at the center of the untouchable canon of 
constitutional law, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2005), as a practical matter, “[n]o 
constitutional theory is taken seriously unless it can accommodate the result in Brown.” Michael 
J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005); see also, 
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 26 (1993) 
(arguing that “an approach to constitutional interpretation is unacceptable if it entails the 
incorrectness of Brown”). 
 282. See BORK, supra note 11, at 77 (“Brown has become the high ground of constitutional 
theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance 
must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not logical necessity, account for the result in 
Brown.”); see also McConnell, supra note 204, at 952 (“The supposed inconsistency between 
Brown and the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous 
importance in modern debate over constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority of Brown 
that if any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, 
the theory is seriously discredited.”). 
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a right to privacy.283 As Cass Sunstein has observed, Bork’s typical 
approach is to seek to resolve specific questions according to the 
specific understanding or expectations of the Framers.284 But when it 
comes to segregation, Bork abandons this approach in favor of one 
that entails taking “the Framers’ understanding at a certain level of 
abstraction or generality” in order to reach results that may be 
inconsistent with the narrow expectations or understandings of the 
Framers, but nonetheless accord with the fundamental values 
underlying the Constitution.285 This approach allows Bork to reach his 
desired result of upholding Brown while still claiming to be a faithful 
originalist.286 To be sure, there have been other issues to which Bork 
has applied a higher-level-of-generality version of originalism. The 
most well known is the scope of the limitations that the First 
Amendment imposes on claims for libel.287 But the flexibility that 
Bork has shown on that question merely confirms our broader 
point—that the wide range of competing versions of originalism 
enables self-professed originalists to reach, while applying ostensibly 
originalist methodology, virtually any result that they wish to reach. 
Finally, consider Justice Thomas, who has long declared himself 
to be an originalist. But of which variety? Justice Thomas has at times 
 
 283. See David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 
1381–82 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 11) (arguing that Bork’s high-level-of-generality 
analysis of Brown is inconsistent with the very originalist methodology that he otherwise 
advocates); see also supra note 203. 
 284. See Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312 
(1995). Sunstein calls this approach “hard originalism.” But see Reynolds, supra note 273, at 
1070 n.90 (“[T]he question—even in Bork’s formulation—is not how the Framers themselves 
would have decided such a question; Bork’s theory is more sophisticated than that. Rather, the 
question is what principles we can draw from the Framers’ understanding of what the 
Constitution was about so as to decide for ourselves whether the Constitution permits bans on 
contraception.”). 
 285. Sunstein, supra note 284, at 313. Sunstein calls this form of originalism “soft 
originalism.” 
 286. See BORK, supra note 11, at 82 (arguing that it is possible to reconcile the result in 
Brown with the Framers’ original understanding that segregation was not objectionable). 
 287. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., 
concurring) (“We know very little of the precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the 
speech and press clauses of the first amendment. But we do know that they gave into our 
keeping the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation of political 
expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the core of those clauses. Perhaps 
the framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to that freedom. . . . But if, over time, 
the libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of the first amendment, why should not 
judges adapt their doctrines?”); Harrison, supra note 138, at 479–80 (noting that Bork’s Ollman 
opinion employs a sort of “purposivism”—originalism that “tak[es] as normative the original 
purpose” of the First Amendment). 
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explicitly sought the original intent of the Framers.288 At other times, 
he has sought the original meaning of the Constitution,289 which he 
equates with the original understanding of the Constitution’s 
meaning290—in particular, with the understanding held by the Framers 
themselves.291 Thus, he often articulates the judge’s task as discovering 
the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution.292 In truth, however, 
 
 288. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “it is unlikely that the Framers intended 
the word ‘witness’ to be read so broadly as to include such statements”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Founders intended that the President 
have primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national security 
and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 
779, 898 n.22 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asking “whether the Framers intended to preclude 
the people of each State from supplementing the constitutional qualifications”). 
 289. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2595 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s holding because it “is not supported by the original meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (seeking “the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”). 
 290. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause 
to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public 
Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain 
power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause’s original meaning, and I would reconsider 
them.” (emphases added)); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 490–91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (equating original meaning with original understanding); see also 
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1556 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting 
the majority’s holding because it “finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 420 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The Tinker Court made little attempt to ground its holding in . . . the original 
understanding of the First Amendment.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that neither party argued whether “our substantive due 
process cases were wrongly decided and . . . [whether] the original understanding of the Due 
Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights”); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Until this Court replaces its 
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original 
understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the 
guise of regulating commerce.”); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) 
(arguing that “when interpreting the Constitution, judges should seek the original 
understanding of the provision’s text”). 
 291. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur 
task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of the word ‘establishment’ 
than it is under the various approaches this Court now uses. The Framers understood an 
establishment necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should 
endeavor to understand what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it 
meant.”). 
 292. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 380 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Framers understood [that] ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to 
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
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he seems not to contemplate any distinction among original intent, 
original understanding, and original textual meaning. For instance, in 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,293 he articulates his 
constitutional jurisprudence as follows: 
When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we must be 
guided by their original meaning, for “[t]he Constitution is a written 
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant 
when adopted, it means now.” We have long recognized that the 
meaning of the Constitution “must necessarily depend on the words 
of the constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the 
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and 
ratification to the conventions . . . in the several states.” We should 
seek the original understanding when we interpret the Speech and 
Press Clauses . . . .294 
This conflation of distinct modes of originalism allows him to draw 
indiscriminately on sources that are of differing value to different 
versions of originalism—Anglo-American law and tradition,295 the 
drafting history of the Constitution,296 the ratification history,297 
 
U.S. 1, 13 (1890))); id. at 385–86 (noting that the “practice of the early Congresses can provide 
valuable insight into the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution”); Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would be willing to 
address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our 
Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”). 
 293. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 294. Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905); Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838)). 
 295. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2596 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(relying on Blackstone); Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(relying on “the historical practices that led the Framers to include [the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause] in the Bill of Rights”). This evidence is of greater import to versions of 
originalism that seek the underlying purpose than to those that seek the objective textual 
meaning. 
 296. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 526 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing congressional debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 876–77 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases that rely on drafting debates from the Constitutional 
Convention). This body of evidence is, of course, of central import to those who seek the 
original intent of the Framers. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 300–02 (relying on 
Convention debates). Proponents of the original-understanding version of originalism, by 
contrast, typically argue that it is inappropriate (and perhaps even illegitimate) to consider 
evidence from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 in seeking to discern the original 
understanding. Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, for example, have argued that the 
original understanding approach’s focus on the ratifiers’ understanding of the text forecloses 
reference to a drafting history that had not been disclosed at the time of the ratification 
conventions, and thus was unknown to the ratifiers. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 159, at 
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postenactment behavior and statements of government officials,298 
and eighteenth-century dictionaries,299 among other evidence300—
which of course broadens his ability to find evidence to support what 
may really be a subconsciously predetermined meaning that yields his 
preferred outcome. 
Indeed, after a thorough study of Justice Thomas’s 
jurisprudence, Scott Gerber has concluded that “Justice Thomas is a 
‘liberal originalist’ on civil rights and a ‘conservative originalist’ on 
civil liberties and federalism.”301 Gerber uses the term “liberal 
originalism” to refer to the notion that the Constitution should be 
interpreted at a higher level of generality to reflect the natural-law 
inspired political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, and 
the term “conservative originalism” to refer to the notion that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in the same manner in which the 
 
576 (“Since originalists maintain that it is the meaning of the text to the ratifiers that counts, they 
should give little weight to an antitextual argument derived from legislative history.”); Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 n.37 
(1995) (“There are very serious reasons to question whether any weight at all should be 
given . . . to Madison’s secret legislative history from Philadelphia . . . .”). But, as Kesavan and 
Paulsen have explained, this evidence is often quite persuasive for original-public-meaning 
textualists, because, among other things, it can help to illustrate the way in which “informed 
eighteenth-century Americans understood and used the language of the Constitution.” Kesavan 
& Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1187. 
 297. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(relying on The Federalist to articulate the actual intentions and understandings of the Framers); 
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 863 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing a speech made by John Jay at 
the New York ratifying convention). This evidence is more important to original understanding 
than it is to original intent or original objective textual meaning. See supra notes 44–70, 252 and 
accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 502–03 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(relying on cases decided shortly after the Framing). This evidence is of greatest value in the 
search for original expected application. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 299. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 492 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (relying on several dictionary definitions for support). Dictionaries are the 
bread and butter of original public meaning textualism. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 621 (“[It] 
can be very disappointing for critics of originalism—and especially for historians—when they 
read original meaning analysis. They expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to 
find references to dictionaries . . . .”). 
 300. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Unfortunately, we have no record of discussions of anonymous 
political expression either in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights, or in the state 
ratifying conventions. Thus, our analysis must focus on the practices and beliefs held by the 
Founders concerning anonymous political articles and pamphlets.”). 
 301. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 193 (1999). 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
304 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:239 
Framers would have interpreted it.302 Thus, explains Gerber, “Justice 
Thomas appeals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the 
Declaration of Independence when he decides questions involving 
race, but to the Framers’ specific intentions—as manifested in the text 
and historical context of the Constitution—when he decides questions 
involving civil liberties and federalism.”303 This allows him to reject 
segregation and affirmative action,304 even though the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment likely would have accepted them,305 while at 
the same time relying on the narrow understanding of the Framers to 
reach politically conservative results in cases involving other issues, 
such as the establishment of religion and abortion.306 It appears that 
his strong personal feelings about race, shaped by his own life 
experience,307 have led him to adopt a different jurisprudence for race 
cases than for other constitutional cases.308 But because both 
jurisprudences can lay claim to the originalist label, Justice Thomas 
can shift back and forth between them all the while insisting that 
“[s]trict adherence to [the originalist] approach is essential if we are 
to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the 
mandate of the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric 
with our own political views.”309 
 
 302. Id. at 47 n.*. 
 303. Id. at 193. 
 304. See id. at 193–94 (citing Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), as an 
example of Justice Thomas’s position on affirmative action, and Justice Thomas’s comments 
about Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953), as an example of his position on 
segregation); Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 
1435–36 (2008) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
 305. See Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–914 (1995) (arguing that the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did not invalidate segregation); 
Rubenfeld, supra note 203, at 429–32 (1997) (arguing that race-conscious Reconstruction 
programs show that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to 
preclude affirmative action); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–83 (1985) (same). 
 306. See GERBER, supra note 301, at 193 (citing Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819 (1995), as an example of Justice Thomas’s position on the Establishment Clause); Book 
Note, supra note 304, at 1435–36 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), as an example 
of Justice Thomas’s position on abortion). 
 307. See generally CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007) 
(describing the role of race in his life). 
 308. See Book Note, supra note 304, at 1435 (arguing that “this framework appears results-
driven, a sort of racial exception to his generally conservative originalism, seeming to reflect 
little more than Justice Thomas’s policy preferences and his desire to remain true to his view of 
racial equality”). 
 309. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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We do not mean to suggest that these judges have consciously 
and consistently acted opportunistically in deploying different 
versions of originalism to different constitutional questions.310 And, 
we suppose, it remains theoretically possible for a conscientious and 
principled judge to select one version of originalism and consistently 
apply it. But the fact that originalist judges can (and, it seems, do), 
even at the subconscious level, choose among these versions—and in 
doing so produce different results than they would have produced had 
they chosen a different version of originalism—suggests that 
originalists’ claims that originalism is likely to be overwhelmingly 
better than its alternatives at constraining judicial discretion are 
substantially overblown. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalists’ ubiquitous claim that they subscribe to a uniquely 
coherent theory has until now gone largely unchallenged. The reality, 
as we have explained, is substantially more complex. There are 
important differences among originalists about the proper way to 
interpret the Constitution—differences that undermine the rhetorical 
and normative claims that underlie much of the originalist enterprise. 
 
 310. Our focus here is on judges, because it is their actions that originalists claim their 
approach can constrain. It is worth noting, however, that even academic originalists—who have 
the luxury of opining in the abstract, without having to issue opinions with the force of law—
have not always escaped the charge of employing inconsistent versions of originalism. For 
instance, Randy Barnett, who is a political libertarian, has claimed that originalism essentially 
yields the conclusion that the Constitution is a libertarian charter. See BARNETT, supra note 79, 
at 356. But, according to Steven Calabresi, he does so only by selectively varying the version of 
originalism that he employs in interpreting different constitutional provisions. See Calabresi, 
supra note 45, at 1083–88 (arguing that Barnett arrives at his libertarian originalism only by 
inconsistently employing a low-level-of-generality version of originalism in interpreting 
constitutional provisions granting powers to the federal government, and a high-level-of-
generality originalism in interpreting constitutional provisions affording rights to individuals). 
Ironically (and perhaps tellingly), Calabresi himself has been criticized by other originalists for 
being imprecise and inconsistent in his articulation and application of originalism. See Kesavan 
& Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1142 & n.99 (noting that Calabresi and his coauthor Saikrishna 
Prakash are sometimes “a bit more imprecise in their description of originalism,” insofar as they 
claim at different points in the same article to seek both the objective understanding of a 
hypothetical ratifier and the actual understandings of the actual ratifiers). Compare Calabresi & 
Lawson, supra note 64, at 1002–03 (employing an “originalist methodology that looks to the 
objective meaning of the Constitution that would have been held by a hypothetical reasonable 
observer in 1788”), with Calabresi, supra note 45, at 1081 (“[W]hat really matters in 
constitutional interpretation is . . . what the original language actually meant to those who used 
the terms in question.” (emphasis added)). 
COLBY & SMITH IN FINAL 10/6/2009  6:28:37 PM 
306 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:239 
We imagine that many committed originalists would respond to 
this Article by asserting, as has Justice Scalia, that originalism’s 
normative claims still carry force because, although there are some 
differences among originalists about their methodology, originalism 
“by and large represents a coherent approach, or at least an agreed-
upon point of departure.”311 But this grossly understates the level of 
disagreement among originalists. As we have endeavored to show, 
originalism does not “by and large” represent a coherent approach. 
And because the shared principles that can be said to animate all of 
its various iterations are remarkably broad, it is an “agreed-upon 
point of departure” only in the way that Chicago’s O’Hare Airport is 
a point of departure: because there are so many flights on so many 
airlines to so many different places, you can use it to get virtually 
anywhere you want to go. 
Originalists thus find themselves in something of a bind. They 
can assert, as Lawrence Solum has suggested,312 that more than one, 
or perhaps even all, originalist theories are legitimate—that is to say, 
that the underlying principles shared by all originalist theories are 
essential to a legitimate constitutional theory, but that one can 
employ a number of distinct legitimate theories derived from those 
principles. But that assertion undercuts the core normative claims of 
many originalists that originalism is uniquely consistent with law and 
democracy and is uniquely capable of constraining judges.313 If all that 
originalism entails is agreement on a point of departure that can still 
take judges wherever they want to go, then it surely fails to live up to 
its lofty claims and promises. One cannot take the position that 
multiple iterations of originalism are legitimate while simultaneously 
touting originalism’s unique fidelity to law, democracy, and judicial 
constraint. 
Alternatively, originalists can assert, as many of them explicitly 
have done, that only one particular brand of originalism is legitimate. 
 
 311. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855. 
 312. See Lawrence B. Solum, Colby and Smith on Originalism (and a Comment About the 
Meaning of Originalism), LEGAL THEORY BLOG, Feb. 15, 2008, http://lsolum.typepad. 
com/legaltheory/2008/02/thomas-colby-an.html (arguing that there is a core of originalist beliefs 
that tie all versions of originalism together); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist 
Theory 1 (Ill. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-16, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346453 (“Originalism is best viewed as a family of theories 
that characteristically affirm . . . [t]he Fixation Thesis . . . [and] [t]he Contribution Thesis . . . .”). 
 313. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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But that assertion, as we have explained,314 undercuts not only the 
facile “it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory” argument, but also the 
notion that originalism is obviously and self-evidently correct. Finally, 
one might contend that all (or at least most) iterations of originalism 
are legitimate, but that true legitimacy requires a judge to choose one 
version and follow it faithfully. But picking and sticking to one 
particular originalist methodology appears to be much harder in 
practice than it is in theory; judges have not done particularly well on 
this score. 
Perhaps our account will aid originalists by informing or 
reminding them that “originalism” is a broad tent and that, to gain 
the professed benefits of an originalist approach, they need to be 
substantially more disciplined and consistent in distinguishing among 
originalist theories. But one wonders whether the temptation to drift 
subconsciously among originalisms in order to reach desired results 
will in fact prove to be insurmountable. Perhaps the true lure of 
originalism lies in its ability to allow judges to claim the interpretive 
high ground by purporting to be bound by objective historical 
meaning, while at the same time giving the judges the wiggle room to 
reach, whether consciously or not, the results that they desire and 
demand. If that is so, then much of the originalists’ case for their 
theory collapses. 
Originalism, it turns out, is not just a work in progress.315 It is in 
fact a loose collection of a staggering array of often inconsistent 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. And the approaches 
themselves continue to change and evolve, sometimes too fast for 
anyone to keep up. Originalists might despise the notion of a “living 
constitution,” but they have gone a long way toward creating a living 
constitutionalism of their own—the very existence of which 
undermines much of their own rhetorical and normative claims to 
superiority. 
 
 314. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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